## 1AC

### 1AC – Manufacturing (1/6)

#### Contention 1 is Manufacturing

#### Emissions restrictions coming now- and cleaner alternatives aren’t feasible

Groom and Reddall 12

[Nichola and Braden, Reuters, 11/7/12, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usa-campaign-energy-companies-obama-idUSBRE8A60N920121107>]

Energy producers braced for tighter regulation in President Barack Obama's second term, with coal companies expecting more emissions restrictions and drillers anticipating less access to federal land even as his platform promotes energy independence. Opponents already believe Obama has waged a "war on coal" through the administration's push for stricter regulation of greenhouse gas emissions by the Environmental Protection Agency. "Four more years of President Obama translates into additional pressure on the coal industry from the EPA and numerous environmental groups," energy investment bank Simmons & Co said in a note to investors on Wednesday. Analysts at ClearView Energy Partners in Washington expect Obama to "continue prosecuting energy policy through regulation and administrative action, with only the courts as a check on that agenda." Miners criticize Obama for not living up to a 2008 promise to develop clean coal technology, arguing that his policies actually preclude the construction of any new coal plants. Shares of U.S. coal companies plunged on Wednesday. Arch Coal and Alpha Natural Resources ended trade down more than 12 percent, while Peabody Energy closed 9.6 percent lower. Eric Green, senior managing partner at Penn Capital Management, which owns coal stocks, said the sell-off was "100 percent related to election results." Alpha Natural Resources Chief Executive Kevin Crutchfield argued that the United States, with the world's largest coal reserves, should use what it has. "We would hope the administration remains true to its campaign promise to support coal as an indispensable part of our nation's energy mix," he said. Yet up to 33 gigawatts of coal-fired power generation is estimated to be due for retirement - 3 percent of U.S. capacity. While tougher emissions regulation play a part, that change is also driven by cheap natural gas as an alternative power source. Obama has paid plenty of lip service to natural gas because it burns cleaner than coal, and his approach to the oil and gas industry in general is more nuanced. He has pledged to cut oil imports in half by 2020 and advocates an "all of the above" approach to developing domestic energy sources. Yet he has also said that he would roll back subsidies for oil companies and reduce U.S. reliance on oil by mandating production of more fuel-efficient vehicles. "The Obama administration really hasn't helped the oil and gas industry," said Michael Linn, founder and former chief executive of Linn Energy. "It's going to be a tough four years." FOOT ON GAS, TAX BREAK THREAT More restrictions are expected for companies drilling on federal lands, as well as more rules governing water management and methane emissions. Any new rules related to hydraulic fracturing may drive up costs for active drillers including Chesapeake Energy Corp and Exxon Mobil Corp. "You are going to have less access to federal lands and tougher government agencies," said Dan Pickering, chief investment officer at TPH Asset Management, part of energy-focused investment bank Tudor Pickering Holt in Houston. Obama's solid support for natural gas on the campaign trail won him praise from America's Natural Gas Alliance, a lobby group. But he also wants to eliminate $46 billion in subsidies for fossil fuel companies, a plan producers vigorously oppose. Virginia Lazenby, chair of the Independent Petroleum Association of America whose members supply 54 percent of U.S. oil and 85 percent of its natural gas, worried about potential "duplicate" federal regulation of what states already do, and rejected the call to collect more tax from the industry. "IPAA hopes President Obama will stop his call to eliminate the crucial tax provisions of intangible drilling costs and percentage depletion, which are not subsidies at all, but allow independent producers to reinvest 150 percent of their cash flow into new energy projects," she said. While the Obama administration put approval of TransCanada's Keystone XL pipeline on hold, eventual approval is expected, which will increase the flow of cheaper crude oil from Canada to refineries on the Gulf Coast at Port Arthur, Texas. Companies with refineries in Port Arthur or in nearby Beaumont include Valero Energy Corp, Royal Dutch Shell, France's Total and Exxon. FORECAST: SUNNY SPELLS, BREEZY Obama has promised more assistance for solar and wind technology, though he will need congressional support to extend tax breaks that help those industries. "Obama can love solar as much as he wants, but I don't know that a whole lot more is going to happen in terms of new, constructive policy," said Morningstar analyst Stephen Simko. Obama's advisers include Energy Secretary Steven Chu, a Nobel Prize-winner with expertise in renewable energy, who regularly talks up the government's role in developing hydraulic fracturing technology. The top White House energy adviser is Heather Zichal, who has been an advocate for green jobs and tackling climate change by reducing dependence on oil. Obama's green policies had a major setback when solar power company Solyndra collapsed after receiving a $535 million federal loan guarantee. And his energy strategy shifted away from climate change when a bill establishing a cap-and-trade system to curb carbon emissions died in the U.S. Senate in 2010. Renewable energy also faces obstacles that are not directly related to policy: competition from low-priced natural gas; lack of infrastructure to connect projects to the grid; and a glut of solar panels putting manufacturers out of business. Yet having Obama back was broadly welcomed by most in the green business. "The renewable energy industry and solar have retained a really important ally in the White House," said Arno Harris, chief executive of U.S. solar installer Recurrent Energy, a unit of Sharp Corp. "Solar and renewable energy were so severely attacked during the campaign that the president's win, I think, gives him a mandate in pursuing a clean energy agenda." CHEMICALS BRACE FOR HIT Obama is also likely to implement long-delayed emissions regulations for industrial boilers that are commonly used by chemical makers. The centerpiece provision, Boiler MACT (Maximum Achievable Control Technology), was proposed in 2004 but effectively shot down by courts before the EPA revived it in 2011. It has been winding its way through courts again, and the EPA is due to issue new rules by December. Obama's victory may embolden EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to further tighten Boiler MACT regulations next month on limits for dioxin, mercury and carbon monoxide emissions. It is not clear if Jackson will stay at the agency in Obama's second term. "While we don't agree with some of the provisions (of Boiler MACT), we think that it will be pushed through more readily than if Romney had won," said Lawrence Sloan, president of the Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates, a trade group.

### 1AC – Manufacturing (2/6)

#### Regulations destroy the economy

Ikenson and Pham 12

[ Daniel J. Ikenson is director of the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, Nam D. Pham is managing partner of ndp|consulting, a strategic research firm that specializes in economic analysis of public policy and legal issues, A Critical Review of the Benefits and Costs of EPA Regulations on the U.S. Economy, November 2012, <http://www.nam.org/~/media/423A1826BF0747258F22BB9C68E31F8F.ashx>]

In 2010 and 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed sweeping new regulations of air emissions, water use and the disposal of combustion residuals from burning coal. The EPA has concluded that the benefits of these emerging regulations would far outweigh their costs. But while there is broad consensus that the short-run costs (three to five years) of only three of the dozens of proposed rules would be in the hundreds of billions of dollars, there is widespread skepticism about the validity of the EPA’s estimated benefits, which have been criticized as uncertain, unrealistic and speculative in nature. The EPA’s benefit estimates have also been criticized because they often assume compliance with technologically infeasible requirements and may assign the same claimed benefit to more than one regulation. According to the EPA’s own assessments, the likely annualized compliance cost with the six proposed regulations evaluated in this report would be between $36 billion and $111 billion per year. For three of those six rules, the EPA provided estimates of the upfront capital expenditures needed for the industry to be compliant—a more relevant measure of short-term costs—and aggregated those costs at $63.1 billion. That significant expense falls short of the $142 billion estimate provided by the industry. One immediate and incontrovertible impact of these new regulations would be an increase in electricity prices. Residential consumers would be affected directly, but electricity is also an intermediate good for business. It is consumed at the commercial and industrial levels in the course of producing and providing goods and services. As consumers of more than 28 percent of electricity production, manufacturers in the United States would see production costs rise. The cumulative impact of the proposed regulations will increase the price of electricity 6.6 percent annually. That would lead to higher prices of manufactured goods and services, resulting in lost sales at home and abroad, which, subsequently, would encourage layoffs and discourage new hiring and investment, render exports less competitive and ultimately suppress U.S. GDP. Specifically, the survey conducted for this report shows that the cumulative impact of the EPA’s proposed regulations could, in a worst-case scenario, cut annual U.S. output by as much as $630 billion and 4.2 percent of GDP. The EPA contends these regulations will create 48,230 jobs for one-time construction of compliance technology in the few years after implementation. However, the long-term impact of the regulations is far more damaging—with a range of 49,000 jobs (EPA estimates) and 9.748 million jobs (industry estimates) lost. **The burden these proposed regulations will create on the economy is enormous.** Moreover, manufacturing-heavy states, such as Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Wisconsin, will pay disproportionately more in compliance costs and initial capital expenditures than other states as a result of these regulations. This report assesses the EPA’s assumptions and conclusions present in its cost-benefit analyses for six key regulations 2 and aims to show why almost every third-party economic study claims that the impact on these emerging regulations on the U.S. economy—particularly on the U.S. manufacturing sector—would be far more severe than the EPA estimates. This report exposes some of the flawed assumptions and analytical shortcomings inherent in the EPA’s assessments and ultimately raises serious questions about the quality and rigor of its estimates.

### 1AC – Manufacturing (3/6)

#### Collapses the global economy

Caploe 09

[David Caploe is CEO of the Singapore-incorporated American Centre for Applied Liberal Arts and Humanities in Asia., “Focus still on America to lead global recovery”, April 7, The Strait Times, lexis]

IN THE aftermath of the G-20 summit, most observers seem to have missed perhaps the most crucial statement of the entire event, made by United States President Barack Obama at his pre-conference meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown: 'The world has become accustomed to the US being a voracious consumer market, the engine that drives a lot of economic growth worldwide,' he said. 'If there is going to be renewed growth, it just can't be the US as the engine.' While superficially sensible, this view is deeply problematic. To begin with, it ignores the fact that the global economy has in fact been 'America-centred' for more than 60 years. Countries - China, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and so on - either sell to the US or they sell to countries that sell to the US. This system has generally been advantageous for all concerned. America gained certain historically unprecedented benefits, but the system also enabled participating countries - first in Western Europe and Japan, and later, many in the Third World - to achieve undreamt-of prosperity. At the same time, this deep inter-connection between the US and the rest of the world also explains how the collapse of a relatively small sector of the US economy - 'sub-prime' housing, logarithmically exponentialised by Wall Street's ingenious chicanery - has cascaded into the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression. To put it simply, Mr Obama doesn't seem to understand that there is no other engine for the world economy - and hasn't been for the last six decades. If the US does not drive global economic growth, growth is not going to happen. Thus, US policies to deal with the current crisis are critical not just domestically, but also to the entire world. Consequently, it is a matter of global concern that the Obama administration seems to be following Japan's 'model' from the 1990s: allowing major banks to avoid declaring massive losses openly and transparently, and so perpetuating 'zombie' banks - technically alive but in reality dead. As analysts like Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman have pointed out, the administration's unwillingness to confront US banks is the main reason why they are continuing their increasingly inexplicable credit freeze, thus ravaging the American and global economies. Team Obama seems reluctant to acknowledge the extent to which its policies at home are failing not just there but around the world as well. Which raises the question: If the US can't or won't or doesn't want to be the global economic engine, which country will? The obvious answer is China. But that is unrealistic for three reasons. First, China's economic health is more tied to America's than practically any other country in the world. Indeed, the reason China has so many dollars to invest everywhere - whether in US Treasury bonds or in Africa - is precisely that it has structured its own economy to complement America's. The only way China can serve as the engine of the global economy is if the US starts pulling it first. Second, the US-centred system began at a time when its domestic demand far outstripped that of the rest of the world. The fundamental source of its economic power is its ability to act as the global consumer of last resort. China, however, is a poor country, with low per capita income, even though it will soon pass Japan as the world's second largest economy. There are real possibilities for growth in China's domestic demand. But given its structure as an export-oriented economy, it is doubtful if even a successful Chinese stimulus plan can pull the rest of the world along unless and until China can start selling again to the US on a massive scale. Finally, the key 'system' issue for China - or for the European Union - in thinking about becoming the engine of the world economy - is monetary: What are the implications of having your domestic currency become the global reserve currency? This is an extremely complex issue that the US has struggled with, not always successfully, from 1959 to the present. Without going into detail, it can safely be said that though having the US dollar as the world's medium of exchange has given the US some tremendous advantages, it has also created huge problems, both for America and the global economic system. The Chinese leadership is certainly familiar with this history. It will try to avoid the yuan becoming an international medium of exchange until it feels much more confident in its ability to handle the manifold currency problems that the US has grappled with for decades. Given all this, the US will remain the engine of global economic recovery for the foreseeable future, even though other countries must certainly help. This crisis began in the US - and it is going to have to be solved there too.

### 1AC – Manufacturing (4/6)

#### Econ decline causes war

**ROYAL 10** Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense

 [Jedediah Royal, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### 1AC – Manufacturing (5/6)

#### Goes nuclear

Merlini 11

[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even **involving the use of nuclear weapons**. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular **rational approach would be sidestepped** by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

#### CCS key to prevent impact to regulations

EPA 10 – US Environmental Protection Agency

“Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage,” http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/CCS-Task-Force-Report-2010.pdf

While CCS can be applied to a variety of stationary sources of CO2 , its application to coal-fired power plant emissions offers the greatest potential for GHG reductions. Coal has served as an important domestic source of reliable, affordable energy for decades, and the coal industry has provided stable and quality high-paying jobs for American workers. At the same time, coal-fired power plants are the largest contributor to U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and coal combustion accounts for 40 percent of global carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emissions from the consumption of energy. EPA and Energy Information Administration (EIA) assessments of recent climate and energy legislative proposals show that, if available on a cost-effective basis, CCS can over time play a large role in reducing the overall cost of meeting domestic emissions reduction targets. By playing a leadership role in efforts to develop and deploy CCS technologies to reduce GHG emissions, the United States can preserve the option of using an affordable, abundant, and domestic energy resource, help improve national security, help to maximize production from existing oil fields through enhanced oil recovery (EOR), and assist in the creation of new technologies for export.

### 1AC – Manufacturing (6/6)

**The plan is key to CCS – solves the impact to EPA regulations**

Frodl 07

[Michael, National Defense Magazine, 10/1/07, “USAF Synthetic Fuel Program Could Help Solve Unwanted Carbon Problem”, Vol. 92 Issue 647, p18-19]

The Air Force is seeking to acquire 50 percent of its fuel needs from domestic sources by 2016, and half of that is expected to come from synthetic fuel, mainly made from coal. The Air Force has promised that the synthetic fuel program will not release more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than fuel made from crude oil. This has created an opportunity for accelerated development of CO2 capture technologies, which promise to solve not only the Air Force's immediate problem, but also those of many industries that rely on fossil fuels and face CO2 regulation. If the revenues from industrial use of recovered CO2 are factored into the equation, CQ2 capture will become much more promising commercially. The industrial uses of CO2 are many, and demand promises to be global. The Air Force energy program is, perhaps, the most ambitious of all the military energy security programs, given just how big the service's fuel needs are. The federal government consumes almost 2 percent of all fossil fuels burned in the United States, and the military consumes the majority of the federal government's piece. The Air Force by itself consumes the largest share — about 1 percent of all fossil fuel consumption in the United States. Shifting half a percent of all U.S. consumption of fossil fuels to another source is no small task. The synthetic fuels that the Air Force needs will principally come from the conversion of coal into liquids. The technology to do this has been around for almost a century — for example, the "FischcrTropsch" process developed in Germany just before World War II. By the end the war, most of the German military was using synthetic fuels. The process was further tweaked by the South Africans during a long trade embargo. Today, all international flights into South Africa refuel using synthetic jet fiiel made from coal. After World War II, the U.S. government sought to develop a domestic synthetic fuel industry to reduce the nation's dependence on foreign oil. But despite billions invested in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the comparative price of oil was too low to justify the investment and Washington pulled the plug on the program. The synthetic fuels program was resurrected in the 1970s after the Arab oil embargo, but shut down again in the 1980s. When U.S. oil drilling and refining slowed down after Hurricane Katrina, fuel costs ballooned. The Air Force faced a major increase in fuel costs and began to think more seriously about diversifying its fuel sources. So synthetic fuels became popular again. This time, with the barrel of crude hovering at about $70, the chances are much lower that the synthetic fuels program will again be shut down. Making liquid fuel from coal has one major environmental drawback: the process releases about as much CO2 as burning the fuel does. That means that a barrel of synthetic jet fuel releases twice as much CO2 as a barrel of jet fuel made from crude. Not long ago, that would not have been a problem. But with the growing public concern about global warming and CO2, lawmakers in Washington are wary about authorizing programs that will lead to any significant growth in the emissions of CO2 by the federal government. To quell those concerns, the secretary of the Air Force recently announced that CO2 capture technology would be applied to the process. CO2 capture technology is not as proven as synthetic fuel production from coal, and it does not come cheap. CO2 capture technology takes different forms. Most approaches that have any real industrial potential are already being developed for the coal-burning electric power utilities. There are two basic forms. One involves a total re-engineering of the combustion of coal, and relies on high temperatures and other tricks to minimize the amount of CO2 released in the process. The other involves post-combustion passing of flue gases through a chemical mix that “scrubs” the CO2 out. CO2 capture technology for “coal to liquids” is related to the forms developed not just for coal burning, but also for burning natural gas, as well as “cracking” oil in refineries. It has the same drawbacks, though — while it can capture 90 percent or more of the CO2 emitted, the process consumes a lot of energy. That bite out of an electric plant’s electricity output is about 25 to 35 percent. Including capital expenditure costs, the cost per kilowatt hour rates jump 50 to 100 percent. Energy industry groups estimate that CO2 capture would require about $20 more per barrel of synthetic fuel from coal. If the barrel without capture costs about $30, a total of $50 would still allow some margin for contractors to recoup costs and make a profit assuming that the barrel of crude stays at about $70.

#### Combination with CTL is key – demonstration of CCS will spillover

Tarka et al 09

[Thomas J. Tarka, P.E. U.S. Department of Energy National Energy Technology Laboratory John G. Wimer U.S. Department of Energy National Energy Technology Laboratory Peter C. Balash U.S. Department of Energy National Energy Technology Laboratory Timothy J. Skone, P.E. U.S. Department of Energy National Energy Technology Laboratory Kenneth C. Kern U.S. Department of Energy National Energy Technology Laboratory Maria C. Vargas U.S. Department of Energy National Energy Technology Laboratory Bryan D. Morreale, Ph.D. U.S. Department of Energy National Energy Technology Laboratory Charles W. White III Noblis, Inc. David Gray Noblis, Inc., “ Affordable, Low-Carbon Diesel Fuel from Domestic Coal and Biomass”, January 14, 2009, <http://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-analyses/pubs/CBTL%20Final%20Report.pdf>]

The CCS technology intended to be applied to the CTL/CBTL process is critical to the future use of coal not only in this process but also in the electric utility industry. Because the use of coal is important in maintaining the competitiveness of the U.S. energy mix, this technology combination offers a unique advantage to the nation. CTL/CBTL with CCS represents the lowest-cost option to demonstrate carbon capture and storage at significant scale while adding only $2/bbl to the required selling price of the product. CTL/CBTL w/CCS has numerous benefits, including but not limited to: (1) production of fuels with significant reductions in GHG emissions, (2) creation of a large scale domestic industry with numerous new skilled job opportunities created, (3) opportunities for R&D – leading to an important new high-tech industry, and (4) competitiveness in a key transportation fuel, using an abundant domestic energy resource, with an improving economic advantage as GHG emission values increase. While the decline in world oil price, at the end of 2008, may temporarily preclude the economic competitiveness of CTL/CBTL fuels, long-term oil price projections show that these fuels are likely to be competitive by the time a plant can be built and extremely profitable in the long therm. As described in Chapter 6, a 3 million barrel per day industry could have domestic economic benefits which exceed $100 billion dollars on an annual basis by 2030. On a net present value basis for the period 2010-2030, the value of the industry in 2008 dollars approaches $400 billion. This economic potential could be enhanced under a number of scenarios, including reduced engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) costs and commodity and equipment costs, associated with the current global recession; technological improvements to the CTL/CBTL process, or the commercial sale of the CO2 as a byproduct, for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) or other purposes. CTL/CBTL with CCS is therefore a technology pathway that can uniquely and simultaneously provide a solution to the divergent energy objectives of our nation.

### 1AC – Air Force (1/15)

#### Contention 2 is the Air Force

#### High oil prices are inevitable and wreck air force budgets- developing alternative sources are key

Starosta 12

[Gabe, Airforce Magazine, July 2012, <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/July%202012/0712fuel.aspx>]

USAF faces a $1.3 billion budget shortfall due to rising fuel prices. It hopes non-petroleum fuels can help solve this recurring problem. No single entity in the United States has been more severely affected by recent fuel price increases than the Air Force. USAF is the largest consumer of fuel in the federal government, but buys its supplies on the open world market and has little or no control over what it pays per gallon. The Air Force spends almost $10 billion every year to fuel its airplanes and power its bases. Most of that money goes toward the purchase of jet propellant 8 (JP-8), the service’s petroleum-based kerosene standard. In Fiscal 2011, $8.3 billion of the Air Force’s $9.7 billion energy bill went to pay for fuel. The challenge service officials face almost every year is figuring out where to get the money to cover that expense when costs rise over the course of the fiscal year. The Air Force, like the rest of DOD, is forced to project estimated costs almost two years in advance as part of its annual budget drill. Performing that sort of exercise is difficult enough for aircraft programs the Air Force directly controls, but it is much harder when trying to predict fuel prices set by a world market that is much too large for the service to influence. Analysts at the Office of the Secretary of Defense provide the military services with a planning factor, essentially a placeholder figure for the estimated cost of fuel two years into the future. The gap between that planning factor and the actual cost of fuel often presents service officials with a funding headache. This year, the Air Force is experiencing a $1.3 billion funding shortfall for fuel in Fiscal 2012 alone—a $1 billion gap that service officials attribute mainly to "blue" base budget operations, or Air Force-specific programs and partly to overseas contingency operations ($300 million). The service originally estimated a $1.4 billion outstanding fuel bill but has since revised that figure downward. Still, the Air Force’s fuel situation is more serious than that of the Army or Navy—simply because the Air Force uses more fuel than its sister services. Back in 2010, the Air Force projected that a gallon of fuel in 2012 would cost about $3.12, but the actual price is now around $3.85, said Maj. Gen. Edward L. Bolton Jr., the Air Force’s deputy assistant secretary for budget. Because the service buys 2.5 billion gallons or more per year, that gap becomes hugely significant and forces the Air Force to move money away from other priorities so that it can keep flying its airplanes, both domestically and overseas. The funding shortfall is bigger this year than it has been in the past. It is larger because the gap between the projected and actual prices was abnormally large and because fuel prices jumped near the beginning of the fiscal year, increasing the time over which USAF had to offset its obsolete price estimate. Still, the service is familiar with having to find money late in the year to pay for gas. "Back in 2009 when we were planning for 2011, the planning factor was $2.37," said Kevin T. Geiss, the Air Force’s deputy assistant secretary for energy. "We entered 2011 at $3.03, and we went up to $3.95. That shows you the huge disconnect, or potential disconnect, [associated with] the planning factor." More Desperate DOD is sometimes fortunate and overbudgets for the price of fuel, "and that’s fun for that short period of time," Geiss said. That last occurred in Fiscal 2009, when the Air Force had the luxury of using funding set aside for JP-8 to pay for other needs. More commonly, though, the department’s predictive measures lag behind reality, and the impact of that lag has become much more serious in the last 10 to 12 years. During that span, the price of fuel has consistently grown both in absolute terms and relative to the early estimates. "The difference between what was budgeted and what we’re paying [this year] is somewhere around $25, $26 a barrel," Bolton said. That cost increase alone "is almost exactly what we were paying per barrel in 2000. Not only has it gone up by five or six times, but the increase this year was equal to what we were paying in one year," he noted. Statistics provided by the Defense Logistics Agency, the organization through which the Defense Department buys fuel, illustrate the trend. In Fiscal 2009, the Air Force spent $5.6 billion for 2.61 billion gallons of fuel. In Fiscal 2011, the service bought almost the same amount of fuel but paid $8.8 billion for it. That’s a $3.2 billion increase, or 57 percent, in energy expenses over just two years. The situation in Fiscal 2012 is even more desperate. Through the first half of this fiscal year, which spanned October 2011 to March 2012, the Air Force paid DLA $4.6 billion for 1.18 billion gallons of fuel. At that pace, the service would spend more than ever—but buy less fuel than it has used in any year since Fiscal 2006 (the earliest year for which DLA provided fuel purchasing records). Once a funding gap is identified, the Air Force has several options it can employ to cover its fuel expenses each year. The service can slow down some operations and conserve fuel; it can move money from other areas into its fuel account, a process that requires approval from Congress; or it can use some combination of the two. Each June, DOD submits an omnibus reprogramming request to Congress asking for permission to move money around and fund urgent needs or pay "year-of-execution" expenses, that is, bills that must be paid during the current year. The Air Force’s portion of the reprogramming often covers a wide range of programs and funding needs, but Bolton said that this year, the service will only ask Congress to let it shift money to pay its must-pay bills covering fuel and the war in Afghanistan, which sometimes overlap. According to Bolton, whose financial management and budget office prepares the service’s draft reprogramming before it is evaluated by OSD, the service has to be careful—and a bit political—in determining what funding sources to ask for permission to raid. This year, for instance, Bolton said he’s confident Congress will approve the Air Force’s recommendation to move money set aside for, but not spent on, incentivizing civilian and military employees to retire early. The service’s working capital fund also is likely to provide some available funding that can be used for fuel payments. After those funding streams, which Bolton called "easy takes," have been exhausted, the service enters slightly more contentious territory. "The next level of controversy would be programs that have had recent restructures," Bolton said. "For example, the [F-35 strike fighter] has had three restructures in the last five years. We did slow down the production rate, so when you go back and you look at [Fiscal 2012 funding], you may, hypothetically, happen to find some money there based upon restructures, fact-of-life changes, underexecution." The third level of the reprogramming, according to Bolton, includes the programs that the Air Force has recommended canceling or downsizing in Fiscal 2013, such as the Global Hawk Block 30 or C-130 Avionics Modernization Program. The service is free to ask Congress for permission to move money from those programs, but lawmakers also have instructed DOD not to take any irreversible actions that assume those recommendations will be approved. Stripping money from those programs while Congress is still evaluating the 2013 budget request might be construed by its members as too presumptive and lead them to reject the Air Force’s proposals. Beyond those sources, the Air Force is left with few other options but to tap its operation and maintenance accounts, which fund flying hours, base operations, weapon systems sustainment programs, and many other daily activities that keep the service up and running. "After we take the things we know we can take, and after we take the investment things that we feel we can take and negotiate, it’s going to come from O&M," Bolton said. Seeking Efficiencies Cutting flying hours is an easy but largely unpopular way to save money, although the Air Force has sometimes chosen to fly less to cover outstanding fuel bills in the past. Geiss stressed, however, that if Army troops in theater call for supplies, an airlift out of danger, or an overhead strike from an F-15, those flights will happen no matter the cost of fuel. Given that need and the consistently high operational tempo in Afghanistan, it is little surprise that flying hours in Fiscal 2012 are on pace to nearly equal those in 2011. A majority of those flights, Geiss said, come from the mobility fleet, which includes cargo aircraft and aerial refuelers. Those aircraft account for 900 flights a day and 60 percent of all Air Force fuel consumption on an annual basis. The Air Force has experience in scrambling to pay fuel bills in the last several months of a fiscal year. At the same time, the service is working on a number of fronts to limit those unforeseen expenses in the future. One avenue the Air Force is pursuing is investing in engine upgrades to some of its legacy aircraft, such as the KC-135 tanker and C-5 cargo hauler, in an effort to generate fuel savings and make sustainment cheaper over the long term. The Fiscal 2013 budget includes funding for KC-135 improvements that Geiss said should avoid $150 million in fuel expenses over the aircraft’s lifetime, but maybe more importantly, save $1 billion in general sustainment costs. The service also has stressed the need to be more efficient with the way it flies its legacy platforms. Service officials often cite improving engine wash procedures, flying more direct routes, enhancing formation flying techniques, and optimizing how much cargo an aircraft takes on board before takeoff as small but important changes the Air Force is making to save fuel. Third, the service is making a point to simply use less fuel, and its target is to decrease consumption by 10 percent (compared to 2006 levels) by 2015. Geiss said the Air Force has managed to trim its fuel usage by about four percent so far. If not for that progress, the service’s outstanding 2012 fuel bill could be even bigger. "If we reduce our consumption in the Air Force, those are real dollars that the Air Force won’t have to steal from somewhere else [in the service], year after year," he noted. There’s also the potentially game-changing process of replacing JP-8 with domestically produced, non-petroleum-based fuel. Air Force officials say they are making progress certifying aircraft to operate on alternative fuels, but the service is not at the point yet of actually buying those fuels in bulk and putting them to operational use. Moreover, Air Force officials have said publicly that they hope to buy alternative fuels from market-based sources rather than investing in developing those fuels within the service. Jeff Braun, chief of the Air Force’s Alternative Fuels Certification Division at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, said that the service has certified every aircraft in the inventory to fly on a 50-50 blend of petroleum-based kerosene and synthetically produced fuel known as Fischer-Tropsch synthetic paraffinic kerosene. The SPK fuel is derived from coal, natural gas, or potentially a naturally occurring biomass. According to Braun, the Fischer-Tropsch blend is available commercially at about the same price as JP-8 and in quantities that would allow the Air Force to cut back on petroleum purchases. This may not save the Air Force money in the short run, but it could help introduce some stability into the fuel budget planning because these synthetic fuels are not subject to the same price fluctuations as traditional jet fuel.

### 1AC – Air Force (2/15)

#### Oil volatility is inevitable and likely --- multiple shocks coming now

**Clayton**, 10/4/**2012** (Blake – fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations, The Real Reason Energy Traders Are Losing Sleep, Foreign Policy, p. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/03/the\_real\_reason\_energy\_traders\_are\_losing\_sleep?page=full)

The potential for oil prices to shoot sharply higher or lower in the coming months due to events far outside OPEC's control is real, though still improbable. An Israeli military strike against Iran has the potential to drive oil prices skyward, just as the spread of Europe's debt crisis could cause oil markets to collapse. Add to this mix the threat of a so-called hard landing for China's economy or Washington falling over the fiscal cliff, either of which could send oil prices sharply lower. Yes, unrest in the Middle East is a continuous threat to stable oil prices, but political decision-making in the West and China is injecting more than its fair share of uncertainty into the market. Part of this uncertainty is the result of policy incoherence in Washington. There is more than a little irony in the fact that the White House may decide to tap the SPR, the nation's 695 million barrel emergency fuel stockpile, to prevent a harmful rise in gas prices stemming in part from the decisions of the Fed. The mere announcement of the latest round of quantitative easing by Ben Bernanke, in addition to the already-loose monetary stance of other major central banks, was enough to send oil prices higher, only to crash shortly thereafter. The bounce would no doubt have been larger had many market participants not anticipated the Fed's decision. But the Fed's aggressive monetary easing is partly responsible for putting the Obama administration in the unenviable position of having to consider dipping into the SPR in order to keep a short-supplied market from pushing up prices too high. And yet the policy dissonance in Washington has not been nearly so vexing to the oil market -- or to financial markets more broadly -- as the uncertainty surrounding the eurozone. Hardly a week passes without investors frantically buying or selling oil on the faintest whisper from the European Central Bank, Chancellor Angela Merkel, or the leaders of the most imperiled debtor nations. The unending lurch from Eden to Armageddon on trading floors around the world is typical of the so-called "risk on, risk off" capital-market mentality that has swept across every asset class -- and oil is no exception. Demand for oil correlates closely to global economic growth. When Europe's nagging ills appear on the mend, the outlook for growth appears brighter, causing oil prices to rise. Ditto on the flip side. But the sheer complexity of the problems facing European leaders, not to mention the uncertainty of domestic support for their policy prescriptions and the risk of cross-border contagion, mean oil prices have lurched to-and-fro with unusual velocity. The prospect of a cataclysmic European tailspin is what economists call a left-side tail risk to prices: low in probability, but with the potential to topple the oil market should worldwide growth stall or even shrink. But right-side tail risk -- that oil markets might spike -- is also causing risk managers to lose sleep. The market's primary worry is an Israeli air strike on Iran, possibly with backing from or in coordination with the United States. If that happens, Tehran may well retaliate by disrupting tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, the passage through which 35 percent of all traded seaborne oil flows. These are not idle fears. U.S.-led naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf, which have included mine-sweeping drills, are already underway, and Iran has test fired missiles at ship-like targets near the Strait. Were Washington or its allies to launch a pre-emptive attack on Iran, oil prices would soar. Though Iran may be setting the stage for a confrontation, Western powers may end up being the ones to pull the trigger, setting off energy markets. Even if such a conflict never materializes, efforts by the United States and the European Union to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions have already contributed to rising prices. Tightening U.S. sanctions and an EU ban on Iranian oil imports have caused the country's crude exports to fall to less than half of last year's average. This tightening of the screws has been disastrous for Iran, which depends on oil for 80 percent of its foreign revenue. By causing prices in the United States to rise, however, this strategy for bringing Tehran to the negotiating table has also been painful for American consumers. Whatever one thinks of the wisdom of sanctions in this or any other case, they have clearly caused global oil markets to labor under a strain that they would not have had to grapple with otherwise. Still other wild cards remain far outside the control of OPEC. Market participants are already speculating about what measures Beijing will take to spur waning real economic growth. Oil has bounced along with other assets investors perceive as relatively risky, like emerging market equities, because of guessing about whether China might opt for more aggressive fiscal and monetary stimulus in the near future. Market fears persist about the possibility of a so-called Chinese "hard landing" and what it could mean for oil prices. Meanwhile, back in the United States, the much-discussed fiscal cliff looms. Its combination of tax hikes and spending sequestrations, due to drop in January if Congress fails to cut a deal, could weigh on domestic growth and hence oil demand. That loss could shave several percentage points off oil prices over the course of several years, according to a recent Citigroup analysis. Any mixed signals from Congress that cause Wall Street to question if or how it might tackle the approaching legislative deadline are sure to set off fireworks in the oil market in the meantime. Make no mistake: Unrest in the Middle East has the potential to destabilize energy markets. With a civil war raging in Syria and North Africa in the midst of a trying transition period, it's not difficult to see how oil supplies could be interrupted. Trouble elsewhere in Africa, in places like the Sudan and Nigeria, is not helping matters. Given these realities, it's hard to imagine a scenario in which oil prices move significantly higher for an extended period absent something going wrong in that part of the world, which contains 70 percent of known oil reserves. Yet when it comes to sovereign decision-making, moves from Washington, Brussels, and Beijing may prove more unsettling to global energy markets in the months ahead than anything OPEC does.

### 1AC – Air Force (3/15)

#### That collapses all air power capabilities – CTL development is key

Bartis et al 8 (James T. – Senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in chemical physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Sc.B. in chemistry, Brown University, Frank Camm – senior economist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. and A.M. in economics, University of Chicago; A.B. in economics, Princeton University, David S. Ortiz – Ph.D. in electrical engineering, M.S.E. in aerospace and mechanical engineering, University of Michigan, “Producing Liquid Fuels from Coal Prospects and Policy Issues”, 2008, http://www.rentechinc.com/pdfs/RAND\_MG754.pdf)

The Military Perspective The U.S. Air Force and the other services are highly dependent on transportation fuels for maintaining readiness and executing their missions. In 2007, DoD consumed petroleum at an average rate of 330,000 bpd. **Jet fuel accounted for about two-thirds of DoD’s petroleum use**. Fuel oil for naval ships accounted for much of the remainder. With the exception of the ships, nearly all of the mobile and combat-support systems in the U.S. armed forces are fueled by a particular formulation of jet fuel known as JP-8 and its close relative JP-5. These fuels are preferred for combat operations because, compared to gasoline, they have a very high energy density per unit volume and because they are less subject to accidental ignition. In recent years, long-term DoD interest in pursuing energy conservation has grown more intense within the U.S. Air Force, by far the largest single user of energy in DoD (Shanker, 2006). DoD’s Assured Fuels Initiative of 2001 placed special emphasis on providing the U.S. military with cleaner fuels derived from secure domestic sources, such as coal and natural gas (Harrison, 2006). Because 80 percent of U.S. Air Force energy use involves aviation fuel, the U**.S. Air Force has given aviation fuel high priority** in its implementation of this initiative. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) gave DoD several openings to approach energy conservation and unconventional-fuel development more proactively (Barna, 2005).1 Surges in world oil prices over the past few years have overwhelmed DoD’s budgeting system, leaving DoD—and the U.S. Air Force in particular—**with insufficient funding to cover its must-pay fuel costs without cutting programmed spending elsewhere** (Dunlap, 2007). In 2005, Hurricane Katrina severely disrupted supplies of refined fuels and drove up their prices briefly but precipitously. This gave the U.S. Air Force a wake-up call about its vulnerability to physical and financial instabilities in fuel markets (Aimone, 2007). Persistently high oil prices have also made DoD planners very conscious of the possible long-term effects on DoD (Wynne, 2007b). Higher oil prices would reduce what DoD could **buy within a fixed top-line budget and so could potentially limit its ability to execute its mission**. Only budget increases to reflect higher oil prices would prevent such negative effects. In the face of what they expect to be increasing competition from domestic policy priorities, DoD planners currently expect limited political tolerance for higher defense budgets (adjusted for inflation) over the long term. Furthermore, the military’s ongoing high operational tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan has made fuel price and availability issues more important to DoD planners and resource managers than they might have been during a more peaceful period.2 In response to rapidly rising fuel prices, the U.S. Air Force has taken a proactive position regarding the development of a commercial FT CTL industry within the United States. Ground and flight testing of blends of FT-derived jet fuel and conventional JP-8 in military aircraft engines are under way, and current plans call for testing and certifying all U.S. Air Force airframes to fly on a synthetic fuel blend by early 2011 (Wynne, 2007c). In support of this certification effort, the Defense Logistics Agency is purchasing flight-test quantities (hundreds of thousands of gallons per year over multiple years) of FT-derived jet fuels. Further, the Air Force is a participant in the Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative, which is a forum sponsored by the commercial aviation trade associations and the Federal Aviation Administration. The U.S. Air Force has also established the goal of being prepared, by 2016, to cost-competitively acquire 50 percent of the Air Force’s domestic aviation fuel requirement via an alternative fuel blend in which the alternative component is derived from domestic sources produced in a manner that is environmentally superior than fuels produced from conventional petroleum.3 If the potential fuel purchases associated with this goal were to be met with 50/50 blends, a production capacity of approximately 20,000 bpd of unblended alternative fuels would be required. Considering the product distribution of an FT CTL plant, attaining this level of jet-fuel production would likely require a domestic FT CTL capacity of between 50,000 and 80,000 barrels (diesel fuel equivalent) per day. The findings of our study, as presented in Chapter Five, show that CTL development offers major economic and security benefits at the national level. As one of the nation’s largest petroleum consumers and as a key component of the nation’s defense, the U.S. Air Force has a stake in reaping these nationwide benefits. Beyond these shared nationwide benefits, unique benefits that would accrue just to or primarily to the U.S. Air Force appear to be less significant, especially in light of the risks and uncertainties associated with alternative-fuel development. For these reasons, the policy options for furthering U.S. Air Force plans and efforts regarding CTL commercial production should be developed and implemented in the context of an overall federal policy framework.

### 1AC – Air Force (4/15)

#### Restrictions on DOD CTL use undermines military strength – alternatives fail

IER 11 (Institute for Energy Research, “China’s Coal to Liquids Program Not Allowed in the United States”, 6/28, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2011/06/28/china%E2%80%99s-coal-to-liquids-program-not-allowed-in-the-united-states/)

Producing oil from coal is a technology that has been around for a long time. Germany used it to fuel its tanks and aircraft during World War II and South Africa is using it today to provide about 30 percent of its gasoline and diesel supply. China is now embracing it since they are the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal. But for the United States, the country with the largest coal reserves in the world, **coal to liquids plants have been stymied** because it is argued that its life cycle greenhouse gas emissions would be higher than that of conventional oil. So, U.S. coal producers in Montana and Wyoming are looking toward Asian markets for new coal sales and coal producers in West Virginia and Kentucky have increased their exports of coal for steel making.[i] Department of Defense’s Energy Policy Tom Hicks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy in the U.S. Navy, **said that the rising price of oil “**dramatically impacts the military**.” For every $1 a barrel increase in oil, the Navy and Marine Corps pay more than $30 million.** So, it is no surprise that the U.S. military would like to find a more economic source of petroleum products. Currently, there is a Congressional ban on the Pentagon’s using high-carbon alternative fuels. Section 526 of the Energy Security and Independence Act of 2007 blocks the Department of Defense from using coal-to-liquid fuels because the life cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from those fuels would be much larger than the GHG emissions from conventional petroleum. **That puts a damper on Air Force plans to certify planes to run on synthetic fuels from coal**, natural gas and biomass. While there are ongoing efforts in Congress to repeal this law, no repeal has been enacted as of yet. For the past few years, the military has promoted alternative fuels from biomass, but so far these fuels are very, very expensive. According to Undersecretary of the Air Force, Erin Conaton, biomass fuel is about 10 times the cost of military aviation jet fuel.[ii] Since the Energy Information Administration reports kerosene-based jet fuel to sell for just over $3 per gallon[iii], jet fuel from biomass according to this account would cost around $30 per gallon. Other estimates are much larger. For example, a blend of 50 percent camelina-based biofuel[1] purchased for the Air Force and Navy last year was reported costing $65 a gallon, making a 100 percent biofuel around $130 per gallon.[iv] Regardless, whether the cost is 10 times or 40 times higher, proponents of biomass fuels would like us to believe that costs can get down to $2 per gallon, but when and how are still an issue China’s Coal-to-Liquids Project China, unlike the United States military, has no problem getting its petroleum products from coal. China’s largest coal producer, the Shenhua Group, is reaping huge profits from a coal-to-liquids project completed in late 2008 in North China. In just the first 3 months of this year, their profits reached more than 100 million yuan or $15.38 million from production of 216,000 tons of refined oil products. The project located in Inner Mongolia is the world’s first large coal-to-liquids plant. Last year, it operated for 5,000 hours and produced 450,000 tons of oil products. It is expected to reach one million tons of annual capacity.[v] With profits of that magnitude in only two years of operation, China has proven that coal-to-liquids is a lucrative business. Meanwhile, the United States **is shut out of that market for military use when it has the largest coal reserves in the world**. China’s Growing Use of Imported Coal While China ranks third in coal reserves, behind the United States and Russia, its coal is low quality containing sulfur, fly ash and dust. Starting this July, China plans to blend cleaner burning imported coal with its domestic coal in six massive silos being constructed near an industrial port in northeastern China. The blended coal will meet tighter environmental regulations and burn more efficiently than domestic coal since it is of higher quality.[vi] China’s Need for Coal is Enormous China has been faced with electric power shortages since April due to high demand, high coal prices, and a drought in southern China causing low hydroelectric output. Precipitation in April was 50 percent less than the average level of past years, resulting in a 20-percent reduction in hydroelectric power generation growth. And, coal prices have doubled in the past five years in China, reaching $130 a ton for coal with high heat content. Statistics from the China Electricity Council indicate that electricity demand is already 12 percent higher than last year having reached 1,090 billion kilowatt-hours during the first four months of this year.[vii] While China has more hydroelectric and wind generating capacity than any other country in the world, those power sources are reliant on water and wind availability and have not been able to fill the increase in China’s electricity demand. Unlike the United States, China does not mind satisfying its electricity demand with reliable coal generation, which represents 73 percent of China’s total generating capacity, and produced a whopping 83 percent of its generation last year.[viii] According to the director of the power industry department of the China’s National Energy Administration, China is constructing 180 million kilowatts of new coal fired plants. In responding to the power shortages, he said, “The government will speed up the examination and approval of these projects and put them into use ahead of schedule.” China is the world’s largest coal producer and consumer, consuming 3.5 times as much coal as the United States.[ix] And, rather than consuming U.S. coal at home, U.S. coal producers are looking to sell their coal to Asian markets since U.S. laws and regulations are either slowing or derailing new growth here. Conclusion China is on a fast track to meet its electricity demand, but not through hydroelectric power or wind power, where it leads the world in capacity, but through coal-fired generation. China is now the home of the world’s largest coal to liquids plant that is reaping in the profits. Yet, the United States fails to learn from China’s lead. The United States has banned the use of coal-to-liquids technology because the greenhouse gas emissions over its life cycle will exceed those of conventional oil. This is despite coal to liquids costs estimated at $45 to $65 per barrel.[x] Thus, U.S. military establishments will either continue to pay for imported crude oil or **invest in biofuel technologies that have a long way to go before they will ever become competitive with conventional sources.**

### 1AC – Air Force (5/16)

#### Approval of contracts is key – saves the air force

Price 09

[Catherine, Popular Science, Flying the Coal-Fired Skies, Feb2009, Vol. 274, Issue 2]

Yes, coal. The U.S. Air Force wants to create a synthetic-fuel industry that, unless something better comes along, will mine America's massive coal supply (we have more than a quarter of the world's known reserves) and turn it into enough jet fuel for half its domestic operations to run on a 50/50 blend of synthetic and regular fuel by 2016. By the Air Force's logic, it has no choice. It uses more fuel than all the other branches of the military combined, burning through 2.5 billion gallons of the stuff in 2007 alone — 10 percent of the total used by the entire domestic-aviation fuel market — at a cost of $5.6 billion. And although oil prices have dropped in recent months, no one expects the relief to last indefinitely. Yet alternative fuels For aviation are hard to come by. The Air Force says it's open to all sources of power For its fleet, but according to former assistant secretary of the Air Force William Anderson, petroleum, natural gas and coal are our only current options — and when you look at the U.S.'s resources, the choice is clear. We re not the largest bolder of oil reserves, so that's not a good option," he says. "We're not the biggest bolder of natural gas. But we are the Saudi Arabia of coal." So the Air Force is doing its best to spark a domestic fuel industry that would he devoted, most likely, to digging new coal mines and building the country's first major coal-to-liquids (CTL) plants. To make the market bigger, it wants to convince the other branches of the military and even domestic airlines to run their fleets on liquefied coal, too. From a purely martial perspective, the strategic benefits of this plan are obvious: The U.S. would use far less oil imported from countries it doesn't get along with. But there are problems, like the fact that the plan could generate twice the carbon dioxide emissions of current fuels — making it, thanks to a special clause in the 2007 energy bill, illegal. One good thing about about transforming coal into jet fuel is that we know bow to do it. In the 1920s, German scientists Figured out a method for turning raw materials such as coal and natural gas into liquid fuel. It essentially involves steaming the coal to produce a hydrogen-and-carbon-monoxide gas, and then, through something called the Fischer-Tropsch process, exposing that gas to a series of catalysts to convert it to a liquid fuel. Hitler used the technique to power Germany in World War II, and during apartheid, when South Africa was facing embargoes, its government tweaked the process so that it could produce jet fuel as well. Once you've got the fuel, it's just a matter of proving that your planes can run safely on it. The Air Force has certified the B-52 and C-17 for unlimited use of a 50/50 synthetic fuel blend; has tested its B-1 Bomber, F-15, F-22 and KC-135; and aims to certify its entire fleet by 2011. CTL proponents, aware that coal has an image problem, lend off criticism by saying that the fuel is actually "greener" than jet fuel made from petroleum. What they mean is that during the gasification process, jet fuel from coal is scrubbed clean of particulate emissions as well as sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide — the stuff that causes acid rain — so it is in one sense cleaner to burn. But that leaves out a crucial bit of information: Between mining the coal and burning the resulting jet fuel, coal-to-liquids fuel produces twice as much CO2 as the existing petroleum-derived fuel. The potential effect of creating a market for CTL fuels is frightening enough to environmentalists that last year Representative Henry Waxman, who now heads the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, added a clause to the 2007 energy bill — Section 526 — forbidding the U.S. government from spending taxpayer money on fuels that emit more greenhouse gases than the fuels we're already using. That hasn't stopped the Air Force from moving ahead with its plan — it simply says that the companies that produce the fuel will have to figure out a way to comply with Section 526. So while lobbyists for both the coal and petroleum industries work aggressively to get Section 526 repealed, potential CTL suppliers are looking into technology that could, theoretic ally, clean coal-based jet fuel enough that it's the greenhouse-gas equivalent of petroleum. There are a few ways to get there, none of them easy, including recycling CO2 by running it back through the Fischer-Tropsch process to produce more fuel (after all, carbon dioxide has carbon in it, the same energy source as fossil fuel), using the CO2 to grow oil-producing algae, or turning the carbon into usable industrial gases. The Air Force estimates that it will be at least a decade, however, before any of those technologies can be used at anywhere near a broad scale. More feasible is using CO2 for something called enhanced oil recovery — liquefying and pumping the CO2 into dying oil wells to push remaining oil to the surface. But the danger in that process is that it might contribute to the very problem it's trying solve, because the energy required for liquefication will almost certainly come from carbon-emitting fossil fuels. Then there are long-term consequences to consider. Will the carbon dioxide leak out of the oil well? No one knows. The same long-term concerns vex another oft-discussed solution: carbon capture and storage. Currently being done at several small demonstration plants outside the U.S., this process involves capturing the CO as it's released from the Fischer-Tropsch reactor (the part where the synthetic gas turns into a liquid fuel) and pumping it into formations underground — essentially sweeping it under the rug, where it may or may not stay. But according to Lowell Miller, director of the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Sequestration, Hydrogen, and Clean Coal Fuels, the real challenge of carbon sequestration is the vast amounts of money it will take to make it work. University of Manitoba professor Vaclav Smil has estimated that sequestering just 10 percent of the world's 2005 CO2 emissions would require more plants and pipelines than are used in the entire worldwide business of crude-oil extraction. And there are other setbacks. Last year the Department of Energy canceled the main feature of its FutureGen project — the creation of the country's first commercial-size coal-fired plant that would capture all of its carbon emissions — because it was so far over budget. ULTIMATELY. THE QUESTION is this: Is it better to send American aviation down the road toward coal-based fuel without a clear idea of what to do about the extra carbon emissions, or to keep on burning billions of gallons of imported oil every year? The lack of alternatives makes this debate tricky. Finding renewable sources of jet fuel is "going to be tough, there's no doubt about it," says Tyson Slocum, director of the public-interest group Public Citizen's Energy Program. "You can't put solar panels on a jet airplane."

### 1AC – Air Force (6/15)

#### And we’d use the fuel

Snider 11 (Annie, E&E reporter, As Congress debates, Air Force stands ready for coal-to-liquid fuels, 7/29/11,

 http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/2011/07/29/archive/7?terms=liquid+coal)

While a fierce battle is being fought in Congress over whether the Defense Department should be able to purchase carbon-intensive fuels like those derived from coal, the Air Force is standing ready and able to use them if the law changes. The service is almost done certifying synthetic fuels, Gen. Philip Breedlove, vice chief of staff of the Air Force, said at an energy conference last week. According to the Air Force Fuels Certification Office, 99 percent of the fleet has been approved to use the fuels, and the two aircraft still being tested should be finished by next September. It was the Air Force's interest in coal-to-liquid fuels that first moved Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) to include a provision in the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act that bans the federal government from buying fuels with a heftier greenhouse gas footprint than traditional petroleum. Supporters of the provision, called Section 526, say it is strategically important for the military to wean itself from fossil fuels and that the provision helps support the department's alternative energy work. "Repeal or exemption of Section 526, as is being discussed on Capitol Hill, is at best unnecessary," Sharon Burke, assistant secretary of Defense for operational energy wrote on the White House blog recently. "Although the Department will strive to make the right choices in any case, repeal could complicate the Department's efforts to provide better energy options to our warfighters and take advantage of the promising developments in homegrown biofuels." Those who want to see the ban overturned, however, say the provision puts dangerous and expensive limits on the military's fuel choices. They are also quick to point out that Burke and other prominent DOD officials who have supported the provision are political appointees. "Our nation's military should not be burdened with wasting its time studying fuel emissions when there is a simple fix -- and that is not restricting their fuel choices based on extreme environmental views, policies and regulations like Section 526," said Rep. Bill Flores (R-Texas) earlier this month when introducing an amendment to the 2012 Defense appropriations bill that would repeal the provision. The bill, with Flores' amendment, was approved by the House earlier this month(E&ENews PM, July 8). The Senate's version of the 2012 Defense authorization bill cleared the Senate Armed Services Committee last month without language related to Section 526, though an amendment is expected when it comes to the floor next month. Several recently introduced stand-alone bills also seek to roll back the provision (E&E Daily, June 1; E&E Daily, May 11). Hoping for cleaner processes Kevin Geiss, the Air Force's deputy assistant secretary for energy, said the service opted to continue the certification program, which was already under way when the ban came into effect, with a hope that advanced technology may one day make synthetic fuels cleaner. "We can't buy those fuels if the production leads to a lifecycle greenhouse gas component larger than traditional fuel," he said. "I am not going to discount that a technology may be developed that could provide a synthetic fuel that meets 526 ... if [it] were, then there would not be a prohibition." The service was able to buy test quantities of synthetic fuels, despite the ban, because of an exemption in Section 526 for research and development. The provision was never meant to stop the Air Force's certification program, a Democratic aide said; it was aimed at large-scale investments the service was considering making in infrastructure like a coal-to-liquid refinery. "The point of the provision was to prevent waste of taxpayer dollars by pushing new alternative fuels that would be worse than regular fuels," the aide said. Now that the synthetic fuels certification process is just about done, the Air Force is focused on certifying a class of biofuels. The Air Force's top energy official told a Senate subpanel yesterday the service is ahead of schedule to meet its 2016 goal. Things have gone faster this time around, in part, because of what the service learned with synthetic fuels, Geiss said last week. "If we had not completed the synthetic certification program, we would not have been able to complete the biofuel program as effectively and efficiently as we did. A lot of the groundwork was already laid." Regardless of whether Section 526 is repealed, though, the military is unlikely to purchase any alternative fuel unless the price is on par with that of traditional petroleum. "We need industry to be able to produce in the quantities we need at a cost-competitive price," Undersecretary of the Air Force Erin Conaton said last week. "The alternative fuels that are available now are just nowhere near the cost of what we can buy [jet fuel] for." Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Jeff Bingaman and Energy Department officials today panned elements of a bipartisan alternative fuels proposal that aims to broaden the use of gasoline alternatives by increasing federal support for both algae- and coal-based liquid fuels

#### No tech barriers

Bartis et al 8 (James T. – Senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in chemical physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Sc.B. in chemistry, Brown University, Frank Camm – senior economist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. and A.M. in economics, University of Chicago; A.B. in economics, Princeton University, David S. Ortiz – Ph.D. in electrical engineering, M.S.E. in aerospace and mechanical engineering, University of Michigan, “Producing Liquid Fuels from Coal Prospects and Policy Issues”, 2008, http://www.rentechinc.com/pdfs/RAND\_MG754.pdf)

Principal Findings U.S. Coal Resources **Can Support a Domestic Coal-to-Liquids Industry Far into the Future** The United States **leads the world with recoverable coal reserves** estimated at approximately 270 billion tons. These reserves are broadly distributed, with at least 16 states having sufficient reserves to support commercial CTL production plants (see pp. 9–12). In 2006, the United States mined a record 1.16 billion tons of coal, nearly all of which was used to produce electric power. Dedicating only 15 percent of recoverable coal reserves to CTL production would yield roughly 100 billion barrels of liquid transportation fuels, enough to sustain three million bpd of CTL production for more than 90 years (see pp. 12–13). Technology for Producing Coal-to-Liquids Fuels Has Advanced in Recent Years In the United States, interest in CTL fuels has concentrated on two production approaches that begin with coal gasification: the Fischer-Tropsch (FT) and methanolto- gasoline (MTG) liquefaction methods. The FT method was invented in Germany during the 1920s and is in commercial practice in South Africa. The Mobil Research and Development Corporation invented the MTG approach in the early 1970s. Both approaches involve preparing and feeding coal to a pressurized gasifier to produce synthesis gas—the important constituents of which are hydrogen and carbon monoxide. After deep cleaning, processing, and removal of carbon dioxide, the synthesis gas is sent to a catalytic reactor, where it is converted to liquid hydrocarbons. The principal Summary xvii products of an FT CTL plant are exceptionally high-quality diesel and jet fuels that can be sent directly to local fuel distributors (see pp. 20–22). In an MTG CTL plant, the synthesis gas is first converted to methanol. The methanol is then converted to a mix of hydrocarbons that are very similar to those found in raw gasoline. Between 90 and 100 percent of the final liquid yield of an MTG CTL plant is a zero-sulfur automotive gasoline that can be distributed directly from the plant. (See pp. 25–26.) A favorable attribute of both approaches is that the synthesis gas can be produced from a variety of feeds, including natural gas, biomass, and coal. Although no FT CTL plants have been built in more than 20 years, the FT approach **has advanced through the recent and ongoing construction of large commercial plants designed to produce liquids** from natural gas that cannot be pipelined to nearby markets (see p. 19). Although no commercial MTG CTL plant has ever been built, we judge the process as ready for initial commercial operations**, based on ten years of large-scale operating experience**, starting in 1985, when the process was commercially applied to produce gasoline from natural-gas deposits in New Zealand (see pp. 24–25).

### 1AC – Air Force (7/15)

#### Oil dependence causes enemy leverage over foreign policy- destroys leadership

**Parthemore and Nagl 10**

[Christine Parthemore is a fellow at the Center for New American Security \*\*Dr. John Nagl is President of the Center for New American Security [<http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Fueling%20the%20Future%20Force_NaglParthemore.pdf>, “Fueling the Future Force Preparing the Department of Defense for a Post-Petroleum Era” September 2010]

The growing world demand for petroleum presents major geostrategic risks. High prices and rising demand are a boon to major suppliers and reserve holders such as Iran and Venezuela, which are unfriendly to the United States. It also affects the international behavior of rising powers such as China, which is on a quest to secure access to natural resources that is in turn expanding its influence around the globe. In Mexico, one of the top suppliers of petroleum to the United States, pipelines serve as an increasingly attractive target for dangerous cartels to fund activities that could undermine the Mexican government, destabilize the region and decrease U.S. homeland security.4 American foreign policy itself has been colored by its growing petroleum demands since the 1970s oil crises and subsequent declaration of the Carter doctrine, which stipulated that the United States would consider threats to the Persian Gulf region threats to its “vital interests” due to the strategic importance of its petroleum reserves.5 Dependence on petroleum for 94 percent of transportation fuel is also a dangerous strategic risk for the United States given the leverage oil can provide to supplier countries. Many European allies have experienced such leverage in action with Russia periodically threatening to reduce or cut off natural gas exports to countries highly reliant on their supplies (and in some cases carrying through with these threats). Similarly, national oil companies and OPEC can choose to increase or decrease their production rates to drive changes in the market. The more the United States reduces its dependence on petroleum, the better it can hedge against petroleum suppliers exerting political leverage over U.S. interests, including in times of crisis. At the operational level, heavy reliance on liquid fuels also constitutes a force protection challenge for DOD. Fuel supply convoys have been vulnerable to attack in both Iraq and Afghanistan, where the services have struggled to adapt to the challenges of terrorism, insurgency and violent extremism. In addition to minimizing these risks in the current wars, DOD must also conceptualize and plan for what the future will likely hold for America’s security. The Navy’s battle against pirates off the coast of the Horn of Africa foreshadows the littoral and unconventional challenges that await the United States in the coming decades, as populations continue to migrate toward the world’s coastal area. These types of problems often manifest at major shipping chokepoints (including petroleum transit chokepoints), and addressing them will include distinctive fueling requirements. The Air Force, likewise, confronts dramatic changes in manned and unmanned flight, in addition to the proliferation of space technologies, all of which could dramatically alter fuel needs. In another example, one recently published AirSea battle concept focused on China notes that the type of conflict it outlines could require hardening fueling infrastructure, improving aerial refueling, “stockpiling petrol, oil, and lubricants” and potentially “running undersea fuel pipelines between Guam, Tinian and Saipan.”6 As the character of warfare changes, DOD will have to continue to consider the attraction of fuel supply lines to opponents.

### 1AC – Air Force (8/15)

#### **Defense costs prevents effective military power- reducing dependence on oil key**

Sussman 12 (Michael Sussman, The writer conducted his graduate studies at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya. He served in the office of the Critic of International Cooperation in the Canadian House of Commons, where he conducted foreign policy analyses. He is currently the president of the strategic consulting firm Samuel Sussman Strategic Consulting Group. His forthcoming book is entitled, Multiple Modernities in the Contemporary Scene, “American military spending and oil dependency”, February 9, 2012)

One of the most crucial problems facing the United States is whether it will be able to maintain its strategic interests in the Middle East. It is expected that US defense expenditures will drastically decrease in the coming six years - official estimates are as high as eight percent, roughly $477 billion, a significant sum when it comes to defense. It is also projected that the US will not have the financial means at its disposal to bolster its allies, marginalizing the potential for Marshall-Plan type subsidies (which totaled $13 billion at the time). Since the Second World War, military might and financially aiding its allies in the Middle East have been two of the major methods used by the US to protect its interests. The reality dictated by the today's situation is ingenuity: the US will have to be resourceful in projecting (at least the perception of) its power, and find new ways of supporting its allies. But even that will not be enough. To mitigate the problem to a manageable level the US must reduce its dependence on oil. It is important to clarify what the expected reduction in US military spending means for US military capabilities. The US is currently the strongest military in the world; its capabilities are exponentially greater than those of any other military in the world. That reality is unlikely to change in the near future, even with the proposed spending cuts. US military spending accounts for over 43% of global military expenditures. The magnitude of that sum becomes realizable when compared to China, which ranks second with 7.3%, and Russia, which ranks third with 3.6%. US military superiority is also evident in the amount of military equipment at its disposal. The US currently possesses 11 aircraft carriers, whereas the rest of the world only has eight (China is building one, but it is not expected to be completed until 2015). What the spending cuts will do, however, is limit the ability of the US to achieve its objectives in the Middle East; the manpower and machinery to conduct such operations will no longer be available. For instance, even if the US maintains the largest air force in the world, it will not have the manpower to conduct the number of operations that it did in the past. In recent years, the US has implemented defense policies aimed at countering the problem, including greater focus on intelligence, special forces units and network-centric warfare. These options are less costly than all-out war; however, they are not able to fully substitute for conventional standing forces. An additional factor is that while aircraft carriers and a well-trained army require time, expertise and capital to develop, and spy rings and anti-missile technology are less costly, it is therefore easier for the US's adversaries to counter these measures with their own spy rings and anti-missile defense technology. It is well known that the reason the Middle East is of particular importance to the US is oil. The US consumes about 50% of all of the crude oil produced in the world, while producing less than 2%. A large percentage of US imports comes from Middle Eastern countries, not to mention the fact that 60% of the world's known oil resources are in the Middle East. Oil may be only a commodity, but it is the commodity that fuels US society, from transporting foods and manufactured goods across the country to powering industries to transporting civilians to work. At the recent Herzliya Conference former CIA director James Woolsey advocated decreased dependency on oil. That can be achieved by the use of alternative fuels, including natural gas. For example, today in Brazil, cars are fueled by ethanol fuel produced from sugarcane. The view that the US should decrease its reliance on foreign oil is not a new one but given the economic downturn it is of even more importance. America's policies in the Middle East in the last half century have often been skewed by the fact that it is beholden to the oil producing regimes. Through incremental decreases in foreign aid and defense spending, coupled with investment in alternative energy technology the US can reach a point where it need no longer rely on some of these local regimes and where it can pursue its true self interest and policies. The money saved on US defense expenditures in the region could be put toward placing its military in other regions. For instances, the US plans to expand its operations in Asia. This will be very difficult to achieve given the defense cuts and its many commitments around the world. It would also deliver a blow to the oil producing regimes that supply the US, and which are also among the greatest violators of human rights and sponsors of terrorism. Without money coming from oil producing countries, Islamist terrorists will suffer a major setback. As an additional benefit, some of the money saved can go towards strengthening manufacturing and US industry. With government support, as well as a large domestic market, the alternative energy industry can become a booming industry in the US - helping to strengthen its economy. By decreasing dependency on the oil producing regimes in the Middle East the US will be freer to focus on other core strategic issues, such as increased Iranian influence, democratization and maintaining security and stability in the region. The US faces a problem of defense cuts and maintaining its interests. Alternative fuels are ready to be utilized. The defense spending problem can be eliminated. Americans should ask themselves why these solutions are not being implemented.

### 1AC – Air Force (9/15)

#### Air power key to Heg

Andres 13

[Richard, professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War College and senior fellow and the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Recapitalizing the U.S. Air Force: Pay Now, Or Pay Later, 3/18/13, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1397]

America’s reputation for invincibility in conventional war, stemming from its superior airpower, has led aggressive states around the world to fear using their militaries as an instrument of foreign policy. Potential opponents understand that the U.S. military can quickly determine the outcome of most state-on-state wars. More than that, though, they know that the cost in U.S. lives is likely to be so low that America will be willing to act as long as a postwar occupation is not required. Before the airpower revolution, this was not the case. In 1990, Saddam Hussein argued that attacking Iraq’s million-man army would result in Vietnam-like casualties. Today, no country believes fear of casualties will deter the United States from using airpower. As a result, for the past two decades state leaderships have been largely unwilling to use cross-border violence or threats of violence against the United States or its friends and allies. This fear of conventional U.S. military power has resulted in one of the longest periods of peace among nations in recorded history. Some argue that this phenomenon derives from some inherent normative impulses toward pacification, but **this peace is likely to last only so long as America continues to project an aura of military invincibility.** That aura will dissipate the first time a country believes that its fighters or surface-to-air missiles can defeat U.S. airpower

### 1AC – Air Force (10/15)

#### Heg solves nuclear war

Brooks et al 13

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A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive

### 1AC – Air Force (11/15)

regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

### 1AC – Air Force (12/15)

#### Specifically, Airpower contains escalation to China and Korean wars

Haffa 12 (Robert P. – Director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center. He is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy, holds an M.A. degree from Georgetown University and a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is an adjunct professor in the Government program at Johns Hopkins University, “Full-Spectrum Air Power: Building the Air Force America Needs”, 10/12, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/full-spectrum-air-power-building-the-air-force-america-needs)

Chapter 2 The Principal Security Challenges Facing the U.S. Military and the Air Force Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey stated recently that the world is more dangerous than at any other time in human history: “More people have the ability to harm us or deny the ability to act than in any time in my life.” The chairman elaborated by pointing to the proliferation of precision weapons—destructive technologies that are now available to a “wider and more disparate pool of adversaries.”[18] **There is a fairly wide consensus** regarding the scope and seriousness of these threats, but the implications for Air Force capacities and capabilities are not always transparent. This chapter outlines the most salient security challenges with the purpose of recommending an agenda for building the Air Force that America needs. China and Anti-Access/Area Denial Leading the list, China’s military buildup and advanced technological developments **threaten America’s ability to project military power** into the Western Pacific region and, thereby, to protect its interests and allies in this vital region. There is great uncertainty that China will be as successful in the future as it has been the past 25 years—a period marked by military modernization and doctrinal reform. We cannot predict with confidence China’s future because the Chinese themselves are unable to do so. However, China’s capabilities, if not its course of action, are clear and inform U.S. strategy and force planning. China is fielding modern capabilities and devising new concepts to deny U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific. These anti-access/area denial capabilities are designed to prevent the U.S. from operating in the region as planned, specifically from forward land bases within relatively short range of the Taiwan Strait, the presumed nexus of conflict. To deny these bases to the U.S. and to threaten sea basing as well, the Chinese are investing in precision-guided surface-to-surface and anti-ship ballistic missiles, highly accurate land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, kinetic and directed-energy anti-satellite weapons, electronic and cyber-attack systems, ground and sea-based defenses of their critical infrastructure, and fourth-generation and possibly fifth-generation fighter aircraft.[19] The 2011 DOD report to Congress on the rising military might of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a number of implications for the U.S. Air Force.[20] The January 2011 flight test of a prototype of the J-20, China’s next-generation fighter, highlights China’s ambition to produce a fighter aircraft that incorporates stealth attributes, advanced avionics, and supercruise-capable engines over the next several years. China is upgrading its fleet of B-6 bombers—originally adapted from the Soviet Tu-16—with a new, longer-range variant that will be armed with a new long-range cruise missile. The PLA Air Force has continued expanding its inventory of long-range, advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and now has one of the largest such forces in the world. Over the past five years, China has acquired multiple SA-20 PMU2 battalions, the most advanced SAM system that Russia exports. China’s aviation industry is developing several types of airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. These include the KJ-200, based on the Y-8 airframe, for AWACS as well as intelligence collection and maritime surveillance and the KJ-2000, based on a modified Russian IL-76 airframe. The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China’s space and counter-space capabilities. A PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations reinforced the importance of operations in space to enable “informatized” warfare, claiming that space is the commanding point for the information battlefield. PLA writings emphasize the necessity of destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance and communications satellites, suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the initial targets of attack to blind and deafen the enemy. PLA military writings describe the use of electronic warfare, computer network operations, and kinetic strikes to disrupt battlefield information systems that support an adversary’s warfighting and power projection capabilities. PLA writings identify integrated network electronic warfare as one of the basic forms of integrated joint operations, suggesting the centrality of seizing and dominating the electromagnetic spectrum. China is developing measures to deter or counter third-party intervention, including U.S. military action in the region. Although many of these capabilities were developed with a focus on Taiwan, they have broad applications and implications extending beyond a Taiwan scenario. China’s approach is manifested by its sustained effort to develop the capability to attack, at long ranges, military forces that might deploy or operate within the Western Pacific. In sum, despite considerable uncertainty, China could emerge over the next decade as a major threat to U.S. security. With increasing anti-access and power projection capability, China’s military could provide the means through which the PLA could seek to replace the United States as the principal military power in the Western Pacific and move toward hegemonic political and economic status in the region. As diplomatic and economic competitions unfold, the mission of the U.S. Department of Defense must be **to maintain a favorable military balance of power in the region to dissuade China** from making any aggressive or coercive moves against U.S. and allied interests in the region. Iran and North Korea: Proliferation of Precision Strike and Nuclear Weapons Iran and North Korea also pose significant risks to American interests and international security because both countries have proceeded with ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs despite international sanctions. Even if sanctions successfully slow their nuclear programs, short-range conventional precision weapons—often referred to as guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles (G-RAMM)—could enable their military forces to mount precision attacks against American air bases overseas, making doubly difficult the deployment of short-range air forces into the theater of operations. Finally, the U.S. government has identified both states as sponsors of terrorism, and they are prime candidates to export primitive nuclear devices and precision conventional weaponry to non-state entities and proxies, such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda. The proliferation of advanced military technologies may allow Iran to develop its own A2/AD capabilities—like China, but on a smaller scale with Iran’s capabilities tailored to the unique geographic characteristics of the Persian Gulf. A recent study of Iran’s growing A2/AD capability argued, “Iran’s acquisition of weapons which it could use to deny access to the Gulf, control the flow of oil and gas from the region, and conduct acts of aggression or coercion are of grave concern to the United States and its security partners.”[21] The study pointed to Iran’s growing A2/AD capabilities in four broad categories: ballistic missiles, possibly armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); G-RAMM holding at risk U.S. and allied forces deployed to bases and ports in the region; weapons and systems designed to close or control the Strait of Hormuz, including fast-attack aircraft, mine-laying platforms, and anti-ship cruise missiles; and air defenses.[22] Iran has invested heavily in ballistic missiles as the primary means of launching conventional (with aspirations for nuclear, chemical, or biological) attacks at long ranges. In the near term, Iran’s missiles lack the accuracy for effective attacks against U.S. and allied bases and ports in the region or against the oil infrastructure in the neighboring Gulf states. Therefore, these weapons would be used to threaten mass attacks against population centers to coerce regional states to deny access to U.S. forces. Precision conventional weaponry is proliferating from a variety of sources. Armed with G-RAMM using commercially available imagery and geo-location, Iran and its proxies could effectively use guided weapons against fixed facilities, such as fuel depots, ports, and airfields. The dominant scenario in a clash with Iran is the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with the declaration of a maritime “exclusion zone” that would deny access to U.S. and allied forces attempting to secure the maritime commons. To carry out this threat, Iran has acquired large numbers of fast-attack surface ships, land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, modern mines, diesel submarines, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that might be used in swarming, kamikaze-like attacks. Iran displays a sophisticated air defense system, although it has not yet acquired Russia’s most potent SAM system, nor integrated those defenses effectively. Iran has demonstrated proficiency in using obscurants and decoys and in deeply burying and protecting key assets, negating the effectiveness of U.S. air strikes with precision weapons. Iran’s future A2/AD capability will likely include more accurate and mobile ballistic missiles, WMDs, G-RAMM, supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, mini-submarines, advanced UAVs, and integrated air defenses armed with state-of-the-art SAMs. In A2/AD, Iran is no China in terms of military capability, but it has advantages that China lacks, particularly in geography.[23] While China has much to defend in a vast region of the Western Pacific, Iran can focus on the 600 mile-long Persian Gulf and specifically the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint. Therefore, Iran can concentrate its growing A2/AD capabilities on a far smaller area if its objective is to make it too costly for the United States to project military power into the region. For the moment, however, an important similarity between Chinese and Iranian ambitions is that both appear content to capitalize on the proliferating precision weapons regime to strengthen their political and economic status in the region, rather than leveraging that increasing strength to launch military attacks. However, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) does not appear to share that reticence. A recent study by the Korea Economic Research Institute in Seoul concluded that North Korea’s offensive military strategy **was superior to the defensive posture of the Republic of Korea** (South Korea) and that North Korea was building up its forces to underwrite its doctrine of “military first politics” under Kim Jong-un, its new ruler.[24] Rather than constructing an A2/AD capability to deter U.S. power projection, North Korea, faced with the formidable South Korean military on its southern doorstep, has instead adopted an offensive posture that threatens a preemptive strike to unify the peninsula on its own terms. In such a scenario, the U.S. military **would become quickly engaged** by virtue of diplomatic commitments and the 28,500 U.S. troops that remain in South Korea. U.S. operational plans call for the rapid deployment of American ground, maritime, and air power to the region. As those operational plans are developed and exercised, they need to account for the capacity and capabilities of a rogue state that dedicates much of its national resources and nearly all of its international prestige to its military forces.[25] North Korea has a million-man army, of which 70 percent is

### 1AC – Air Force (13/15)

forward-deployed within 60 miles of the demilitarized zone. Counting reserves and irregulars, North Korea’s ground forces are twice the size of South Korea’s land army. Pyongyang has enough plutonium for six to eight nuclear weapons and has claimed that it has weaponized all of its fissile material. The regime is also pursuing a parallel uranium-based nuclear weapons program, which eventually could augment North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. North Korea has recently tested anti-ship cruise missiles and new versions of short-range, intermediate-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The North Korean government has declared that South Korea is no longer the sole target of its missiles and WMDs. North Korea’s “four major military lines” of converting the country into a fortress, arming the population, increasing the sophistication of the military, and modernizing its military forces support the objective of communizing the entire peninsula. North Korea advocates a blitzkrieg strategy using a forward-deployed arsenal of self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket launchers that holds the city of Seoul at risk. North Korea has forward-deployed roughly 40 percent of its 1,200 fighter aircraft to bolster its air raid capabilities in the initial stages of conflict. North Korea has adopted a “juche” strategy calling for a hybrid of Soviet-inspired conventional warfare with Mao’s unconventional guerrilla warfare. It has 120,000 special operations forces that are dedicated to asymmetric warfare. North Korea has the world’s third largest arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. North Korea’s military is increasing its ability to launch cyber attacks against American and South Korean forces. The military threat from North Korea should not be exaggerated. Experts and findings from war games point to its aging and outdated equipment, which could fall prey to the more sophisticated air forces of the United States and the Republic of Korea. In addition, South Korea has been very deliberate in responding to the North’s military provocations, such as referring to the sinking of the corvette Cheonan and the significant loss of life to the United Nations for investigation. South Korea has also developed an extensive defense reform program to improve its capacity to respond effectively to North Korean provocations. In addition, Seoul created a new Northwest Islands Command and deployed additional forces and sensors to the West Sea, the location of the Cheonan attack and artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Nevertheless, the provocations have continued, diplomacy has bogged down, North Korea’s nuclear capability has continued to increase, and its new, young, and untried leader is clinging to the traditional “military first” policy. Thus, South Korea and the U.S. continue to seek and implement measures that will prevent North Korea’s leaders from launching a more serious preemptive attack that could plunge the peninsula into war. These force planning contingencies should not be taken lightly. While the military balance measured against Iran and North Korea may seem to favor the United States and its allies when compared with the increasing capability of China, regarding these rogue states simply as lesser-included cases would be a mistake. RAND’s Project Air Force has conducted in-depth research on what they have defined as nuclear-armed regional adversaries: “countries that pursue policies that are at odds with the United States and its security partners, whose actions run counter to broadly accepted norms of state behavior, and whose size and military forces are not of the first magnitude.”[26] That research led to an important conclusion that deterring the use of nuclear weapons by either North Korea or a newly armed Iran “could be highly problematic in any plausible conflict situations…for the simple reason that adversary leaders may not believe that they will be any worse off having used nuclear weapons than if they were to forego their use.”[27] The implications of the RAND findings for this paper and for building Air Force capabilities and capacities is that the United States military needs **to offer high assurance that it can prevent these** would-be adversaries from using nuclear weapons, rather than deter them, as is the case with China. This calls for a modern conventional military force **that in contested airspace** can hold at risk enemy command and control, WMD, and their delivery systems. It requires high-caliber reconnaissance-strike systems that can locate, pinpoint, and attack hardened fixed targets as well as identifying and attacking targets on the move. In perhaps the most important difference between planning a force to prevent, rather than deter, active defenses will be required to destroy delivery vehicles after their launch, but before they can strike regional bases and ports. A final threat emanating from these nuclear-armed regional adversaries is that they may proliferate precision-guided weapons and, perhaps, primitive nuclear devices to non-state actors dedicated to carrying out terrorist attacks against American and allied interests.

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#### U.S. response to North Korea is key – solves nuclear war

TBO 13 (Tampa Bay Online, “Sensible response to North Korea,” 3-18-13,

<http://www2.tbo.com/news/opinion/2013/mar/18/sensible-response-to-north-korea-ar-661950/>)

The United States once again faces the dreadful possibility that an enemy — this time an enemy widely believed to suffer from delusions of military grandeur — may try to make good on its threat to attack our country with that most fearsome of weapons, a long-range missile with a nuclear warhead. North Korea has perhaps the world's most inscrutable political and military leadership. So when that leadership — personified by the immature and inexperienced Kim Jong Un — threatens to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike, then precautionary steps must be taken, even if the threat is more likely bluster than believable. There are valid reasons for concern. In December, North Korea for the first time successfully launched a long-range rocket, although its stated purpose was simply to put a satellite into orbit. Months earlier, a powerful mobile missile — one that American authorities believe is capable of reaching the United States — was spotted in a North Korean military parade. Its mobility suggests it could be moved from place to place and therefore made more difficult to detect from the sky. Last week, the North Korean government sneered that "the puppet authorities and despicable reptile media are taking issue with" its plans to continue expansion of its nuclear capabilities. Those "puppet authorities" are, of course, the political and military leaders across the border in South Korea, a reliable ally of the United States. The North Koreans also declared they were nullifying the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, an agreement that was reached after the Korean War of the 1950s. It would be nice to believe that North Korea is merely engaged in the ancient political art of saber-rattling, but Washington can't take that risk.

### 1AC – Air Force (14/15)

#### Extinction

Hayes and Green 10 (Peter, Professor of International Relations – Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology and Director – Nautilus Institute, and Michael Hamel, Victoria University, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, Nautilus Institute Special Report, 1-5, http://www.nautil us.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)

At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

### 1AC – Air Force (15/15)

#### Chinese nationalism is inevitable- failure to contain escalation causes extinction

Lieven 12 (Anatol, Professor in the War Studies Department – King’s College (London), Senior Fellow – New America Foundation (Washington), “Avoiding US-China War,” New York Times, 6-12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html)

#### Relations between the United States and China are on a course that may one day lead to war. This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional policies are set out in “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” an important forthcoming book by the Australian international affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, “Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default.” To escape this, White makes a strong argument for a “concert of powers” in Asia, as the best — and perhaps only — way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China. Moreover, China is engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups — disputes in which Chinese popular nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present

### Extra – 1AC Chem Industry

#### EPA regulation decks the chemical industry

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[Rebecca, US correspondent for Research Europe, 4/29/09, <http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/News/2009/April/24040901.asp>]

Chemical facilities could face burdensome permits and pricey construction requirements following the US Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) preliminary determination that greenhouse gas emissions endanger human health and welfare. The EPA is proposing to find that current and projected concentrations of six primary greenhouse gases - carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride - pose the threat, and should be regulated under the nation's Clean Air Act. The agency's action means that it is on a course to eventually set emission standards for these substances, with motor vehicles likely to be the first targets in the EPA's sights. A final endangerment finding alone would not lead to the regulation of these emissions from stationary sources like chemical facilities, but would likely pave the way for such action. If the proposed finding sticks, many close observers predict that chemical facilities could be required to install costly controls in an attempt to minimise greenhouse gas emissions. Vulnerable chemical facilities would be those emitting more than 250 tonnes of a regulated pollutant per year. 'These are extremely low thresholds for CO2 and could potentially sweep in tens of thousands of previously unregulated sources,' warns Leslie Hulse, assistant general for the American Chemical Council (ACC), a major chemical company trade group. Years away 'If emissions of any of these six substances contribute to climate change and harm human health, it doesn't matter where they come from - motor vehicles or chemical facilities that emit similar substances,' explains Jonathan Adler, a lawyer with Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, who specialises in environmental and regulatory law. He predicts that the EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from cars could be two years away, and says stationary sources will likely follow. 'This is very ominous for the chemical industry,' agrees Peter Ferrara, who directs entitlement and budget policy at the Institute for policy innovation, a non-profit public policy organisation based in Lewisville, Texas, US. 'To the extent that chemical facilities emit CO2, they'll have a tough time operating,' says Ferrara, who served in the White House Office of policy development under former President Reagan, and as the US associate deputy attorney general under the first President Bush. If the EPA does issue a final endangerment finding and eventually regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles, coal burning utilities may elect to switch fuel once they are required to significantly reduce their emissions. Such a development, the ACC cautions, would impair the chemical industry's access to affordable, reliable supplies of natural gas. Furthermore, the ACC argues that the EPA regulation of greenhouse gases from stationary sources would be problematic because it would force energy-intensive industries like chemistry, steel, aluminium and paper, to re-evaluate their presence in the US. Not only would the country face greater difficulty in attracting new manufacturing production capacity, the group says, but it would struggle to maintain the commercial and economic viability of manufacturing facilities that remain. For its part, the EPA is playing down the significance of the development. All the speculation about the implications of the 'scientific draft finding' is simply too premature, says the agency.

#### Chemical industry solves extinction

Baum 99(Rudy M., C%26EN Washington, Chemical and Engineering News, Millennium Special Report, 12-6, [http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/991206/7749spintro2.html- l](http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/991206/7749spintro2.html-http%3A/pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/991206/7749spintro2.html))

Here is the fundamental challenge we face: The world's growing and aging population must be fed and clothed and housed and transported in ways that do not perpetuate the environmental devastation wrought by the first waves of industrialization of the 19th and 20th centuries. As we increase our output of goods and services, as we increase our consumption of energy, as we meet the imperative of raising the standard of living for the poorest among us, we must learn to carry out our economic activities sustainably. There are optimists out there, C&EN readers among them, who believe that the history of civilization is a long string of technological triumphs of humans over the limits of nature. In this view, the idea of a "carrying capacity" for Earth—a limit to the number of humans Earth's resources can support—is a fiction because technological advances will continuously obviate previously perceived limits. This view has historical merit. Dire predictions made in the 1960s about the exhaustion of resources ranging from petroleum to chromium to fresh water by the end of the 1980s or 1990s have proven utterly wrong. While I do not count myself as one of the technological pessimists who see technology as a mixed blessing at best and an unmitigated evil at worst, I do not count myself among the technological optimists either. There are environmental challenges of transcendent complexity that I fear may overcome us and our Earth before technological progress can come to our rescue. Global climate change, the accelerating destruction of terrestrial and oceanic habitats, the catastrophic loss of species across the plant and animal kingdoms—these are problems that are not obviously amenable to straightforward technological solutions. But I know this, too: Science and technology have brought us to where we are, and only science and technology, coupled with innovative social and economic thinking, can take us to where we need to be in the coming millennium. Chemists, chemistry, and the chemical industry—what we at C&EN call the chemical enterprise—will play central roles in addressing these challenges. The first section of this Special Report is a series called "Millennial Musings" in which a wide variety of representatives from the chemical enterprise share their thoughts about the future of our science and industry. The five essays that follow explore the contributions the chemical enterprise is making right now to ensure that we will successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century. The essays do not attempt to predict the future. Taken as a whole, they do not pretend to be a comprehensive examination of the efforts of our science and our industry to tackle the challenges I've outlined above. Rather, they paint, in broad brush strokes, a portrait of scientists, engineers, and business managers struggling to make a vital contribution to humanity's future. The first essay, by Senior Editor Marc S. Reisch, is a case study of the chemical industry's ongoing transformation to sustainable production. Although it is not well known to the general public, the chemical industry is at the forefront of corporate efforts to reduce waste from production streams to zero. Industry giants DuPont and Dow Chemical are taking major strides worldwide to manufacture chemicals while minimizing the environmental "footprint" of their facilities. This is an ethic that starts at the top of corporate structure. Indeed, Reisch quotes Dow President and Chief Executive Officer William S. Stavropolous: "We must integrate elements that historically have been seen as at odds with one another: the triple bottom line of sustainability—economic and social and environmental needs." DuPont Chairman and CEO Charles (Chad) O. Holliday envisions a future in which "biological processes use renewable resources as feedstocks, use solar energy to drive growth, absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, use low-temperature and low-pressure processes, and produce waste that is less toxic." But sustainability is more than just a philosophy at these two chemical companies. Reisch describes ongoing Dow and DuPont initiatives that are making sustainability a reality at Dow facilities in Michigan and Germany and at DuPont's massive plant site near Richmond, Va. Another manifestation of the chemical industry's evolution is its embrace of life sciences. Genetic engineering is a revolutionary technology. In the 1970s, research advances fundamentally shifted our perception of DNA. While it had always been clear that deoxyribonucleic acid was a chemical, it was not a chemical that could be manipulated like other chemicals—clipped precisely, altered, stitched back together again into a functioning molecule. Recombinant DNA techniques began the transformation of DNA into just such a chemical, and the reverberations of that change are likely to be felt well into the next century. Genetic engineering has entered the fabric of modern science and technology. It is one of the basic tools chemists and biologists use to understand life at the molecular level. It provides new avenues to pharmaceuticals and new approaches to treat disease. It expands enormously agronomists' ability to introduce traits into crops, a capability seized on by numerous chemical companies. There is no doubt that this powerful new tool will play a major role in feeding the world's population in the coming century, but its adoption has hit some bumps in the road. In the second essay, Editor-at-Large Michael Heylin examines how the promise of agricultural biotechnology has gotten tangled up in real public fear of genetic manipulation and corporate control over food. The third essay, by Senior Editor Mairin B. Brennan, looks at chemists embarking on what is perhaps the greatest intellectual quest in the history of science—humans' attempt to understand the detailed chemistry of the human brain, and with it, human consciousness. While this quest is, at one level, basic research at its most pure, it also has enormous practical significance. Brennan focuses on one such practical aspect: the effort to understand neurodegenerative diseases like Alzheimer's disease and Parkinson's disease that predominantly plague older humans and are likely to become increasingly difficult public health problems among an aging population. Science and technology are always two-edged swords. They bestow the power to create and the power to destroy. In addition to its enormous potential for health and agriculture, genetic engineering conceivably could be used to create horrific biological warfare agents. In the fourth essay of this Millennium Special Report, Senior Correspondent Lois R. Ember examines the challenge of developing methods to counter the threat of such biological weapons. "Science and technology will eventually produce sensors able to detect the presence or release of biological agents, or devices that aid in forecasting, remediating, and ameliorating bioattacks," Ember writes. Finally, Contributing Editor Wil Lepkowski discusses the most mundane, the most marvelous, and the most essential molecule on Earth, H2O. Providing clean water to Earth's population is already difficult—and tragically, not always accomplished. Lepkowski looks in depth at the situation in Bangladesh—where a well-meaning UN program to deliver clean water from wells has poisoned millions with arsenic. Chemists are working to develop better ways to detect arsenic in drinking water at meaningful concentrations and ways to remove it that will work in a poor, developing country. And he explores the evolving water management philosophy, and the science that underpins it, that will be needed to provide adequate water for all its vital uses. In the past two centuries, our science has transformed the world. Chemistry is a wondrous tool that has allowed us to understand the structure of matter and gives us the ability to manipulate that structure to suit our own purposes. It allows us to dissect the molecules of life to see what makes them, and us, tick. It is providing a glimpse into workings of what may be the most complex structure in the universe, the human brain, and with it hints about what constitutes consciousness. In the coming decades, we will use chemistry to delve ever deeper into these mysteries and provide for humanity's basic and not-so-basic needs

## 2AC

### Chem

#### Extinction

Sandberg et al 8—Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University. PhD in computation neuroscience, Stockholm—AND—Jason G. Matheny—PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh—AND—Milan M. Ćirković—senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade. Assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad. (Anders, How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?, 9 September 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction)

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens **are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive**. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

### Econ

#### Domestic manufacturing is key to overall resilience

Ettlinger, 11 [Michael, Vice President for Economic Policy at the Center for¶ American Progress Prior to joining the Center, he spent six years at the Economic¶ Policy Institute directing the Economic Analysis and Research Network.¶ Previously, he was tax policy director for Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute¶ on Taxation and Economic Policy for 11 years. He has also served on the staff of¶ the New York State Assembly. “The Importance and Promise¶ of American Manufacturing Why It Matters if We Make It in America and Where We Stand Today”, http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/04/pdf/manufacturing.pdf]

Manufacturing is critically important to the American economy. For generations,¶ the strength of our country rested on the power of our factory floors—both the¶ machines and the men and women who worked them. We need manufacturing¶ to continue to be a bedrock of strength for generations to come. Manufacturing¶ is woven into the structure of our economy: Its importance goes far beyond what¶ happens behind the factory gates. The strength or weakness of American manufacturing¶ carries implications for the entire economy, our national security, and the¶ well-being of all Americans.¶ Manufacturing today accounts for 12 percent of the U.S. economy and about¶ 11 percent of the private-sector workforce. But its significance is even greater¶ than these numbers would suggest. The direct impact of manufacturing is only a¶ part of the picture.¶ First, jobs in the manufacturing sector are good middle-class jobs for millions of¶ Americans. Those jobs serve an important role, offering economic opportunity to¶ hard-working, middle-skill workers. This creates upward mobility and broadens¶ and strengthens the middle class to the benefit of the entire economy.¶ What’s more, U.S.-based manufacturing underpins a broad range of jobs that¶ are quite different from the usual image of manufacturing. **These are higher-skill**¶ **service jobs** that include the accountants, bankers, and lawyers that are associated¶ with any industry, as well as a broad range of other jobs including basic research¶ and technology development, product and process engineering and design, operations¶ and maintenance, transportation, testing, and lab work.¶ Many of these jobs are critical to American technology and innovation leadership.¶ The problem today is this: Many multinational corporations may for a¶ period keep these higher-skill jobs here at home while they move basic manufacturing¶ elsewhere in response to other countries’ subsidies, the search for cheaper¶ labor costs, and the desire for more direct access to overseas markets, but eventually¶ many of these service jobs will follow. When the basic manufacturing leaves, the feedback loop from the manufacturing floor to the rest of a manufacturing¶ operation—a critical element in the innovative process—is eventually broken.¶ To maintain that feedback loop, companies need to move higher-skill jobs to¶ where they do their manufacturing. And with those jobs goes American leadership in technology and innovation. This¶ is why having a critical mass of both manufacturing and associated service jobs in¶ the United States matters. The “industrial commons” that comes from the crossfertilization¶ and engagement of a community of experts in industry, academia, and¶ government is vital to our nation’s economic competitiveness.¶ Manufacturing also is important for the nation’s economic stability. The experience¶ of the Great Recession exemplifies this point. Although manufacturing¶ plunged in 2008 and early 2009 along with the rest of the economy, it is on the¶ rebound today while other key economic sectors, such as construction, still¶ languish. Diversity in the economy is important—and manufacturing is a particularly¶ important part of the mix. Although manufacturing is certainly affected¶ by broader economic events, the sector’s internal diversity—supplying consumer¶ goods as well as industrial goods, serving both domestic and external markets—¶ gives it great potential resiliency.¶ Finally, supplying our own needs through a strong domestic manufacturing sector¶ **protects us from international** economic and political **disruptions**. This is most¶ obviously important in the realm of national security, even narrowly defined¶ as matters related to military strength, where the risk of a weak manufacturing¶ capability is obvious. But overreliance on imports and substantial manufacturing¶ trade deficits weaken us in many ways, **making us vulnerable** **to everything from**¶ **exchange rate fluctuations to** trade embargoes to **natural disasters**.

### Econ Turn

#### Commodification arguments are wrong---policy solutions through the use of markets are the only way to prevent extinction

Wagner 11 Gernot, economist at EDF, where he works in the office of economic policy and analysis, “But Will the Planet Notice? How Smart Economics Can Save the World.” Hill and Wang Press, p. 11-12

The fundamental forces guiding the behavior of billions are much larger than any one of us. It's about changing our system, creating a new business as usual. And to do that we need to think about what makes our system run. In the end, it comes down to markets, and the rules of the game that govern what we chase and how we chase it. Scientists can tell us how bad it will get. Activists can make us pay attention to the ensuing instabilities and make politicians take note. When the task comes to formulating policy, only economists can help guide us out of this morass and save the planet. In an earlier time with simpler problems, environmentalists took direct action against the market's brutal forces by erecting roadblocks or chaining themselves to trees. That works if the opposing force is a lumberjack with a chain saw. It might even work for an entire industry when the task is to ban a particular chemical or scrub a pollutant out of smokestacks. But **that model breaks down when the opposing force is ourselves**: each and every one of us demanding that the globalized market provide us with cheaper and better food, clothes, and vacations. **There is no blocking the full, collective desires of the billions** who are now part of the market economy and the billions more who want to—and ought to—be part of it. The only solution is **to guide all-powerful market forces in the right direction** and create incentives for each of us to make choices that work for all of us. The guideposts we have today for market forces evolved helter- skelter from a historical process that gave almost no weight to the survival of the planet, largely because the survival of the planet was not at stake. Now it is. Since we can't live without market forces, we need to guide them to help us keep the human adventure going in workable ways, rather than continue on the present path right off the edge of a cliff.

### Neoliberalism K – 2AC

#### No collective suicide.

**Bostrom 2** (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

Some foreseen hazards (hence not members of the current category) which have been excluded from the list of bangs on grounds that they seem too unlikely to cause a global terminal disaster are: solar flares, supernovae, black hole explosions or mergers, gamma-ray bursts, galactic center outbursts, supervolcanos, loss of biodiversity, buildup of air pollution, gradual loss of human fertility, and various religious doomsday scenarios. The hypothesis that we will one day become “illuminated” and **commit collective suicide** or stop reproducing, as supporters of VHEMT (The Voluntary Human Extinction Movement) hope [43], appears unlikely. If it really were better not to exist (as Silenus told king Midas in the Greek myth, and as Arthur Schopenhauer argued [44] although for reasons specific to his philosophical system he didn’t advocate suicide), then we should not count this scenario as an existential disaster. The assumption that it is not worse to be alive should be regarded as an implicit assumption in the definition of Bangs. Erroneous collective suicide is an existential risk albeit one whose **probability seems extremely slight**. (For more on the ethics of human extinction, see chapter 4 of [9].)

#### Turn – Collapsing neoliberalism results in increased corporate power

Legrain 00 (Phillipe Legrain, special adviser to the WTO director general Mike Moore, 2000, The WTO: Boon or Bane for the Developing World, p. http://www.focusweb.org/publications/2000/The%20WTOThe%20WTO-Boon%20or%20Bane%20for%20the%20Developing%20World.htm)

A convincing case for the WTO’s abolition must show two things. First, that the world would be **better off** without the WTO. Second, that the WTO's abolition is preferable to **any politically feasible reform**. You fail to show either. Abolishing the WTO would not **destroy globalisation, capitalism, or US corporate power**. But it would **wipe out** a forum for governments to negotiate multilateral trade rules and a mechanism for holding them to those rules. That would make **every country worse off**, but **the biggest losers would be the poor and the weak**. One benefit of rules is that they apply to big, rich countries as well as small, poor ones. When America blocked imports of Costa Rican underwear, Costa Rica appealed to the WTO. It won, and America lifted its restrictions. Do you honestly think Costa Rica would have such clout in Washington **without the WTO?** Granted, the dispute-settlement mechanism is not perfect: America has a battery of lawyers to fight its corner, whereas small countries scrimp. It should be improved. But it is already much better than the alternative: the law of the jungle, where might makes right. Another merit of WTO rules is that they tie governments’ hands. Once countries open their markets to foreign trade and investment, they cannot close them again at whim. Without this stability, companies would be reluctant to invest abroad, particularly in developing countries with a protectionist or politically unstable record. Abolishing the WTO would further **marginalise developing countries**. If there were no prospect of further multilateral liberalisation and no body to enforce existing rules, trade barriers would creep up as protectionists gain the upper hand. The world might split into hostile regional blocks, with rich-country exporters **seeking captive markets in developing countries**. Developing countries, which need access to rich-country markets more than rich countries need access to theirs, would have to join on **unfavourable terms** or be left out in the cold. In any case, there would be less trade. And less trade means slower economic growth, stagnating living standards and more people trapped in poverty – like in the Great Depression. Over the past 50 years, the 15-fold rise in world trade has driven a seven-fold rise in world output. Thanks to trade, Japan and South Korea are no longer developing countries. Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner of Harvard University found that developing countries with open economies grew by 4.5 per cent a year in the 1970s and 1980s, while those with closed economies grew by 0.7 per cent a year. At that rate, open economies double in size every 16 years, while closed ones must wait a hundred. Of course, in the short term, some people lose from trade liberalisation. But in the long run, everyone gains: even the poorest South Koreans today are much richer than their counterparts 30 years ago.

#### K doesn’t come first

**Owens 2002** (David – professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millenium, p. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology **over explanatory** and/or interpretive **power** as if the latter two were merely a **simple function** of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), **it is by no means clear that it is**, in contrast, wholly dependent **on these philosophical commitments**. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but **this does not undermine** the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, **it is not the only or even necessarily the** most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a **question for social-scientific inquiry**, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one **theoretical approach which gets things right**, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Alt fails – it can’t overwhelm massive structural entities such as the WTO and the economic system that is in place – if it can – then it proves the perm solves

**Neoliberalism is inevitable – markets control our thought**

**Hudson 99** [Mark, Progressive Librarian, Fall, “Understanding Information Media in the Age of Neoliberalism: The Contributions of Herbert Schiller”]

Neoliberal ideas are as old as capitalism itself, but in recent decades they have seen a tremendous resurgence and have displaced the state-interventionist economic theories of the interwar and post-World War II periods to become the reigning ideology of our time. Neoliberalism emerged full force in the 1980s with the right-wing Reagan and Thatcher regimes, but its **influence has** since **spread** across the political spectrum to encompass not only centrist political parties but even much of the traditional social-democratic left. In the 1990s, neoliberal hegemony over our politics and culture has become so overwhelming that it is becoming difficult to even rationally discuss what neoliberalism is; indeed, as Robert McChesney notes, the term "neoliberalism" is hardly known to the U.S. public outside of academia and the business community (McChesney). The corporate stranglehold on our information and communications media gives neoliberal ideologues a virtually **unchallenged platform** from which to blast their pro-market messages into every corner of our common culture. At the same time, neoliberalism provides the ideological cover for deregulatory legislation (most recently the 1996 Telecommunications Act) that enables corporations to extend their monopoly over these media even more. For the past three decades, one of the fiercest and most coherent critics of corporate control over the information/communications sphere has been the social scientist Herbert Schiller. Although Schiller began his career before neoliberalism's ascendance, and he does not even today use the term in his writings, his work provides essential insights into the roots of neoliberal/corporate hegemony over our information media and the adverse consequences of that hegemony for our politics, economy and culture.

#### Extinction outweighs

Bok 88

(Sissela, Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Rosenthal and Shehadi, Ed.)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through your actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such responsibility seriously – perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish. To avoid self-contradiction, the Categorical Imperative would, therefore, have to rule against the Latin maxim on account of its cavalier attitude toward the survival of mankind. But the ruling would then produce a rift in the application of the Categorical Imperative. Most often the Imperative would ask us to disregard all unintended but foreseeable consequences, such as the death of innocent persons, whenever concern for such consequences conflicts with concern for acting according to duty. But, in the extreme case, we might have to go against even the strictest moral duty precisely because of the consequences. Acknowledging such a rift would post a strong challenge to the unity and simplicity of Kant’s moral theory.

#### Their analysis of neoliberalism is reductive – it over-simplifies complex social processes and negates possibilities for political transformation.

**Barnett 5** (Clive, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University, Geoforum 36, “The consolations of ‘neoliberalism,’” p. 9-10, Ebsco)

The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism—whether neo-Marxist and Foucauldian—comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives ‘take’ in everyday situations. So perhaps the best thing to do is to stop thinking of “neoliberalism” as a coherent “hegemonic” project altogether. For all its apparent critical force, the vocabulary of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors “out there”, who are always framed as engaging in resistance or contestation. The conceptualization of “neoliberalism” as a “hegemonic” project does not need refining by adding a splash of Foucault. Perhaps we should try to **do without the concept of “neoliberalism” altogether**, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about “neoliberalism” manage to **reduce** the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule (see Clarke, 2004a). Stories about “neoliberalism” pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. Consider the example of the restructuring of public services such as health care, education, and criminal justice in the UK over the last two or three decades. This can easily be thought of in terms of a ‘‘hegemonic’’ project of “neoliberalization”, and certainly one dimension of this process has been a form of anti-statism that has rhetorically contrasted market provision against the rigidities of the state. But in fact these ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, politics, and culture. These factors include changing consumer expectations, involving shifts in expectations towards public entitlements which follow from the generalization of consumerism; the decline of deference, involving shifts in conventions and hierarchies of taste, trust, access, and expertise; and the refusals of the subordinated, refer- ring to the emergence of anti-paternalist attitudes found in, for example, women’s health movements or anti-psychiatry movements. They include also the development of the politics of difference, involving the emergence of discourses of institutional discrimination based on gender, sexuality, race, and disability. This has disrupted the ways in which welfare agencies think about inequality, helping to generate the emergence of contested inequalities, in which policies aimed at addressing inequalities of class and income develop an ever more expansive dynamic of expectation that public services should address other kinds of inequality as well (see Clarke, 2004b). None of these populist tendencies is simply an expression of a singular “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”. They are effects of much longer rhythms of socio-cultural change that emanate from the bottom-up. It seems just as plausible to suppose that what we have come to recognise as “hegemonic neoliberalism” is a **muddled** set of **ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations** to these unstable dynamics of social change as it is to think of it as the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological projects. Processes of privatization, market liberalization, and de-regulation have often followed an ironic pattern in so far as they have been triggered by citizens’ movements arguing from the left of the political spectrum against the rigidities of statist forms of social policy and welfare provision in the name of greater autonomy, equality, and participation (e.g. Horwitz, 1989). The political re-alignments of the last three or four decades **cannot** therefore **be adequately understood** in terms of a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values of individualism, or as a re-imposition of class power. The emergence and generalization of this populist ethos has much longer, deeper, and wider roots than those ascribed to “hegemonic neoliberalism”. And it also points towards the extent to which easily the most widely resonant political rationality in the world today is not right-wing market liberalism at all, but is, rather, the polyvalent discourse of ‘‘democracy’’ (see Barnett and Low, 2004).

### Neoliberalism – A2 Neolib Causes War

**Neoliberalism isn’t the root cause of war**

**Roberts and Sparke 3** (Susan, Professor of Geography – University of Kentucky, and Matthew, Professor of Geography – University of Washington, “Neoliberal Geopolitics,” Antipode, 35(5), p. 886-897)

Barnett’s work is our main example in this paper of a more widespread form of neoliberal geopolitics implicated in the war-making. This geopolitical world vision, we argue, is closely connected to neoliberal idealism about the virtues of free markets, openness, and global economic integration. Yet, linked as it was to an extreme form of American unilateralism, we further want to highlight how the neoliberal geopolitics of the war planners illustrated the contradictory dependency of multilateral neoliberal deregulation on enforced re-regulation and, in particular, on the deadly and far from multilateral re-regulation represented by the “regime change” that has now been enforced on Iraq. Such re-regulation underlines the intellectual importance of studying how neoliberal marketization dynamics are hybridized and supplemented by various extra-economic forces.2 Rather than making neoliberalism into a **totalizing economic master narrative**, we therefore suggest that it is vital to examine its inter-articulation with certain dangerous supplements, including, not least of all, the violence of American military force. We are not arguing that the war is completely explainable in terms of neoliberalism, nor that neoliberalism is reducible to American imperialism. Instead, the point is to explore how a certain globalist and economistic view of the world, one associated with neoliberalism, did service in legitimating the war while simultaneously finessing America’s all too obvious departure from the “end of the nation-state” storyline.

[Continues]

As we said at the start, we do not want to claim too much for neoliberalism. It cannot explain everything, least of all the diverse brutalities of what happened in Iraq. Moreover, in connecting neoliberal norms to the vagaries of geopolitics, we risk **corrupting the analytical purchase of neoliberalism** on more clearly socioeconomic developments. By the same token, we also risk obscuring the emergence of certain nonmilitarist geoeconomic visions of global and local space that have gone hand in hand with neoliberal globalization (see Sparke 1998, 2002; Sparke and Lawson 2003). But insofar as the specific vision of neoliberal geopolitics brought many neoliberals to support the war (including, perhaps, Britain’s Tony Blair as well as Americans such as Friedman), insofar as it helped thereby also to facilitate the planning and overarching coordination of the violence, and insofar as the war showed how the extension of neoliberal practices on a global scale has come to depend on violent interventions by the US, it seems vital to reflect on the inter-articulations.

### Neoliberalism – No Alternative

#### There's no feasible alternative to neoliberalism - your alt is too vague to be effective and kills educational discussion

Yglesias 11 (Matthew, Contributor @ Think Progress, "What Is The Alternative To ‘Neoliberalism’?," 7/18, http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2011/07/18/272099/what-is-the-alternative-to-neoliberalism/?mobile=nc)

The fact that Doug Henwood disagrees with me about monetary policy has suddenly turned into a sprawling cross-blog discussion of “neoliberalism” and its discontents. Personally, I find the argument to be infuriatingly devoid of content, but here’s Henry Farrell’s core claim, devoid of examples:¶ Neo-liberals tend to favor a combination of market mechanisms and technocratic solutions to solve social problems. But these kinds of solutions tend to discount politics – and in particular political collective action, which requires strong collective actors such as trade unions. This means that vaguely-leftish versions of neo-liberalism often have weak theories of politics, and in particular of the politics of collective action. I see Doug and others as arguing that successful political change requires large scale organized collective action, and that this in turn requires the correction of major power imbalances (e.g. between labor and capital). They’re also arguing that neo-liberal policies at best tend not to help correct these imbalances, and they seem to me to have a pretty good case. To put it more succinctly – even if left-leaning neo-liberals are right to claim that technocratic solutions and market mechanisms can work to relieve disparities etc, it’s hard for me to see how left-leaning neo-liberalism can generate any self-sustaining politics.¶ Having read this and various people agreeing with it, I have no idea what it is that we’re disagreeing about. Neoliberals on this telling, favor progressive taxation. Non-neoliberals criticize this agenda as not politically workable in the long-term. And they counterpose as their alternative, more workable agenda, . . . what? Kevin Drum offers this effort:¶ I don’t know the answer either. But as I said a few months ago, “If the left ever wants to regain the vigor that powered earlier eras of liberal reform, it needs to rebuild the infrastructure of economic populism that we’ve ignored for too long. Figuring out how to do that is the central task of the new decade.” It still is.¶ So I really, strongly, profoundly agree with this. The moment someone comes up with a workable idea on this front, please sign me up. But if there’s no idea to debate, then there’s no idea to debate. Debating the desirability of devising some hypothetical future good idea seems kind of pointless to me.

### General Process – 2AC

#### It’s acceptable within the range of “should”

GAO 8 (Government Accounting Office, Exposure Draft of Proposed Changes to the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, http://www.gao.gov/govaud/cl\_iia080331.pdf)

The second sentence of the “must” definition used in the exposure draft instructions is more aligned with the definition of “should” as used by other standards setters, including GAO. The definition of “should” as used by GAO, which is intended to be consistent with the definition used by the AICPA and the PCAOB, indicates a presumptively mandatory requirement and contains the following language: “…in rare circumstances, auditors and audit organizations may depart from a presumptively mandatory requirement provided they document their justification for the departure and how the alternative procedures performed in the circumstances were sufficient to achieve the objectives of the presumptively mandatory requirement.” We suggest that the IIA move the second sentence of the “must” definition to the “should” definition. The definition of “must” needs to be clear that “must” indicates an unconditional requirement and that another procedure cannot substitute for a “must.” Also, we suggest adding language to the definition of “should” to indicate that substituting another procedure for a “should” requirement is allowed only if the auditors document their justification for the departure from the “should” and how the alternative procedures performed in the circumstances were sufficient to achieve the objectives of the “should” requirement. The IIA should review every “must” requirement in the Standards to determine whether there are acceptable alternatives to the procedure; if so, “should” is the appropriate word.

####  “Resolved” means law

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Certainty key to investment

**Krepinevich 8**

 (Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., President, is an expert on US military strategy, policy and operations, military revolutions, and counterinsurgency. He gained extensive strategic planning experience on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense, in the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, and as a member of the National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation, and the Joint Forces Command’s Transformation Advisory Board. He is the author of numerous CSBA reports on such topics as the Quadrennial Defense Review, alliances, the war in Iraq, and transformation of the US military. He has provided expert testimony before congressional committees, as well as academic and other professional groups. 2008 S t r a t e g y f o r t h e L o n g H a u l Defense Investment Strategies in an Uncertain World http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2008.08.21-Defense-Investment-Strategies.pdf)

What factors contribute to successful investing in periods of discontinuity? One is the ability to identify those capabilities that stand to lose much of their value once the major shift occurs in the competitive environment, and those that will grow rapidly in value. This is not easy, as the exact time and form of discontinuities are difficult to predict with confidence. Another key is the ability to minimize the costs imposed on US defense investments by risk and uncertainty**.** These costs are incurred because an investment strategy simply cannot take into account all the myriad factors that will shape the future competitive environment. There are, however, ways to increase the odds of investing wisely. Investors, for example, typically develop strategies to hedge against risk and uncertainty, so they are able to compete at least at minimal acceptable effectiveness levels across the range of plausible futures. Most importantly, investment strategists must avoid the pitfall of using uncertainty as a rationale to avoid major change. The temptation to adopt a “wait-andsee” attitude can be great. Decision makers can fall prey to the illusion that, by doing so, they are preserving their options. But this is a chimera. Choices are being made. Resources are being allocated. Finally, a critical component to any investment strategy is a clear statement by the DoD leadership describing its vision of the future competitive environment, the objectives to be achieved, and how the Department’s investment strategy will enable those objectives to be met. In military terms, this means investment planners must have some understanding of both the key strategic and operational challenges confronted by the armed forces, as well as the point-of-departure operational concepts for dealing with these challenges. Absent a compelling vision of what discontinuities might emerge and at least some first-order assessment of how they might be addressed, there is a strong bias toward continuing down the current investment path.

### Reg Neg

#### CP gets waterd down

Coglianese 1 (Cary, Assistant Prof Public Policy – Harvard, Environmental Law Journal, Lexis)

Negotiated rulemaking's emphasis on unanimity also makes it more likely that the final outcome will succumb to the lowest-common-denominator problem. The outcome that is minimally acceptable to all the members of a negotiated rulemaking committee will not necessarily be optimal or effective in terms of achieving social goals. A recent study of negotiated rulemaking conducted by Charles Caldart and Nicholas Ashford shows that in industries that are not likely to innovate in the absence of strong governmental regulation, the lowest-common-denominator problem keeps negotiated rules from promoting the technological innovation needed to improve environmental and safety performance. [276](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=41fdcf56cb8c8ce0afc3937b5b6a330b&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAl&_md5=e6a939da1291edc95cd9728cf795aa8c#n276#n276) They conclude that because industry representatives in these types of industries will be reluctant to agree to regulations that would compel firms to make dramatic investments in new technologies, "negotiated rulemaking's focus on consensus can effectively remove the potential to spur innovation." [277](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=41fdcf56cb8c8ce0afc3937b5b6a330b&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAl&_md5=e6a939da1291edc95cd9728cf795aa8c#n277#n277)

#### -- Courts strike it down

Ackerman 94 (Susan Rose, Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale University, Duke Law Journal, April, Lexis)

How should policymakers decide which approach to regulation is best given our commitment both to public participation and to technical competence and efficiency? The initial consideration is a constitutional one. Because both regulatory negotiation and incentive systems involve private individuals, they raise concerns about the extent to which the government can delegate public tasks to the private sector. American democracy traditionally is wary of delegating policymaking tasks to private groups. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, [36](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=762dde15a6417f9ffe2b8d3c74e25bc3&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAz&_md5=718b4f4bd1b457efd3d5b55b0e4a2e5e#n36#n36) the U.S. Supreme Court objected to Congress's reliance on industry self-regulation. The Government urges that the codes will "consist of rules of competition deemed fair for each industry by representative members of that industry -- by the persons most vitally concerned and most familiar with its problems." . . . But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? . . . The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.

#### -- CP trades-off with labor mediation

Hodges 96 (Ann C., Prof Law, U Richmond, Administrative Law Journal, Winter, Lexis)

The agencies might use mediators from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), an experienced mediation agency. [384](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7248c817292902a2c6ccb0a48fb4838&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAz&_md5=7651b66e0ed7246704be7e48415ab4f9&focBudTerms=reg%20neg%20or%20negotiated%20rulemaking%20w/20%20energy%20or%20environment%21&focBudSel=all#n384#n384) FMCS mediators are stationed around the country, avoiding the geographical problems of using employees located in Washington. There is some debate among mediation scholars, however, as to whether the approach to mediation used successfully in labor disputes is appropriate in civil rights disputes. [385](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7248c817292902a2c6ccb0a48fb4838&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAz&_md5=7651b66e0ed7246704be7e48415ab4f9&focBudTerms=reg%20neg%20or%20negotiated%20rulemaking%20w/20%20energy%20or%20environment%21&focBudSel=all#n385#n385) In labor disputes, the mediated settlement (as well as the non-mediated settlement) reflects the power of the parties. A labor contract negotiation is, in essence, a power contest. By way of contrast, mediation of a civil rights dispute involves the external standards of the statute. On that basis some might argue that FMCS mediators are inappropriate for the task of rights-based mediation, at least without some assurance that the mediators could make the transition in mediation approach. [386](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7248c817292902a2c6ccb0a48fb4838&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAz&_md5=7651b66e0ed7246704be7e48415ab4f9&focBudTerms=reg%20neg%20or%20negotiated%20rulemaking%20w/20%20energy%20or%20environment%21&focBudSel=all#n386#n386) FMCS mediators do have some experience in mediation of cases involving statutory civil rights under the Age Discrimination Act. [387](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7248c817292902a2c6ccb0a48fb4838&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAz&_md5=7651b66e0ed7246704be7e48415ab4f9&focBudTerms=reg%20neg%20or%20negotiated%20rulemaking%20w/20%20energy%20or%20environment%21&focBudSel=all#n387#n387) A study of the mediation program found it difficult to evaluate, however, because of the unavailability of data. [388](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7248c817292902a2c6ccb0a48fb4838&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAz&_md5=7651b66e0ed7246704be7e48415ab4f9&focBudTerms=reg%20neg%20or%20negotiated%20rulemaking%20w/20%20energy%20or%20environment%21&focBudSel=all" \l "n388#n388" \t "_self) FMCS mediators would require ADA training. A second concern about use of FMCS mediators is their availability. Currently, the first priority of the FMCS is mediation of labor disputes. Absent contrary congressional direction, these disputes are likely to continue as first priority because of the number of people impacted by such disputes, their immediacy, [389](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7248c817292902a2c6ccb0a48fb4838&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAz&_md5=7651b66e0ed7246704be7e48415ab4f9&focBudTerms=reg%20neg%20or%20negotiated%20rulemaking%20w/20%20energy%20or%20environment%21&focBudSel=all" \l "n389#n389" \t "_self) and the inclinations of the mediators who [\*1079]  presumably joined the agency with a goal of mediating such disputes and are experienced at doing so. Accordingly, without a significant infusion of additional mediators, mediation of ADA cases in a timely manner might be difficult, if not impossible**.**

#### Key to the economy

Toner 3 (John J., Chief of Staff – FMCS, FY 2001 Annual Report, www.fmcs.gov/assets/files/annual%20reports/FY2003\_Annual\_Report\_with\_correction.doc)

As the nation’s economy tightened, but appeared slowly headed toward recovery, the war in Iraq created new economic concerns. Those concerns, coupled with the lingering impacts of 9-11, continued dramatic increased health insurance costs, pension cost pressures caused by dramatic declines in financial markets and an aging workforce, technological changes impacting the nature of the work and where the work is performed, as well as increased global competition, impacted collective bargaining negotiations over the last year. Fiscal year 2003 was a critical bargaining year, with major contracts expiring in the following industries: aerospace, defense, transportation, shipping, telecommunications, food manufacturing, construction, health care, as well as federal, state and local governments. While the West Coast ports and Verizon disputes remained in the public eye, mediators were actively involved in 6640 collective bargaining contract negotiations in every major industry and service throughout the United States during the fiscal year. With our assistance, 4988 contracts were reached. As a result, 75% of our dispute cases resulted in negotiated settlements. With respect to work stoppages, there were 289 work stoppages during this fiscal year. The West Coast ports dispute involved a work stoppage of approximately 10 days, with a significant impact on the nation’s economy. We have been actively involved in settling severe work stoppages around the nation, including a 14 day strike involving 4000 Lockheed Martin machinists who manufacture F-16 fighter jets, a series of one-day rolling strikes by 6000 service and maintenance employees working in 14 Minneapolis/St. Paul hospitals and clinics, and a 55-day strike among 500 employees employed by Waukesha Engine. We have been equally successful at averting strikes. We averted a work stoppage at Verzion, where a strike would have involved close to 80,000 employees and phone service in 13 states. Strikes were also prevented in a defense-related dispute involving 10,000 Northrop Grumman Ship Systems employees, and 2000 employees of the Denver Colorado Regional Transportation District, which provides mass transit to 250,000 riders. D. GPRA Achievements: The Government Performance and Results Act requires all federal agencies to identify performance goals. For every service provided, we identified specific goals for fiscal year 2003 and the chart below identifies our performance during this fiscal year: In addition to the above chart, it should be noted that the Agency continues its success rate in dispute cases. In this fiscal year, we settled 75% of our collective bargaining mediation cases. Although we were unable to secure collective bargaining agreements in 25% of our cases, this does not mean that we were not otherwise successful. In this regard, the mediator could have assisted the parties in reducing the number of open or unresolved issues. Another important measurement of success includes the number of times the labor-management community consented to a mediator’s intervention. As noted above, not every case is assigned to a mediator. Once a case is assigned, the mediator contacts the parties to offer his/her assistance. Even where cases are assigned to mediators and the mediator offers assistance, the parties must consent to the mediator’s intervention. Mediation is a voluntary process and even a skilled mediator cannot intervene in the absence of consent. Bearing this in mind, in fiscal year 2003, we assigned 19,516 cases to mediators. It is presumed that, in each case, the assigned mediator contacted the parties and offered his/her services to resolve the dispute. Of those assigned cases, the parties accepted mediation 6640, roughly 34% of the time, consistent with last year’s rate of 35%. Over the next fiscal year, we will work to improve our penetration rate by continuously educating the public about the mediation process and its advantages in order to increase the number of situations where our services can be utilized and work stoppages avoided. E. New Initiatives: 1. Strategic Plan: The Agency’s five-year strategic plan was recently approved by the Office of Management and Budget. To chart the Agency’s future course, we looked at certain trends that have a significant impact on the workplace including (1) the cost and complexity of health care; (2) the effects of globalization on the workplace; (3) the application and importance of technology in the workplace; and (4) workplace litigation and conflict focusing on individual employees outside the scope of collective bargaining and focusing on individual employees. With these factors in mind, we crafted our strategic goals, which focus on: Minimizing the number and severity of work stoppages influencing interstate commerce, national security, and/or the U.S. health care industry; Increasing the number of collective bargaining partners with an ongoing commitment to improving their relationship; Facilitating a commitment to, and development of, systems for handling workplace disputes arising outside of the collective bargaining context, by labor and management at a significant number of organizations; Assisting labor and management to effectively deal with major issues that drive conflict in the evolving workplace, including health care, technology, effects of globalization, and diversity; and Sharing knowledge gained from the Agency’s experience in workplace conflict resolution with those outside of the workplace context such as schools, courts, and international organizations. The Agency’s plan details the strategies we will employ to achieve these goals and our annual performance plans will address specific performance measurements we will use to determine our success in each area. 2. Web site In fiscal year 2003, the Agency launched its new Web site. The Web site was designed with the President’s Management Agenda E-government Initiative in mind: it affords the public easy access to the Agency and its programs. The Web site provides a wealth of information about each Agency department and the services available to the labor-management community. The Web site has the following capabilities: On-line filing of statutorily-required contract expiration notices (F-7 forms) through the website; On-line filing of arbitration panel requests; On-line filing of grant applications; On-line quarterly submission of grantee progress reports; On-line registration for Institute courses; Publication of FMCS-related Federal Register announcements; Repository of all Agency reports to Congress, including Annual Reports, Performance Plans and Strategic Plans; Regular updates on cases of national significance (i.e., West Coast Ports dispute and current Verizon dispute) with links to newspaper articles of interest; Video messages from the Director, speeches delivered by staff members, and articles published by employees; Links to TAGS e-conferences; Cases of interest and best practices are regularly posted; and Communication for the public, via e-mail, to Agency personnel. 3. Access to Neutrals Program In FY 2003 we proposed a registry of neutrals program. The purpose of the initiative is to develop a register of individuals, approved by the Agency, to whom we can refer employment-related disputes (i.e., EEO cases) where the Agency might be unable to assign a mediator to attend to that dispute. A description of the program was published in the Federal Register in May 2003. We have reviewed all of the public comments and, during fiscal year 2004, we will meet with interested parties to address questions and issues related to implementation of the program. F. Summary All FMCS activity is aimed at promoting and improving conflict resolution and collective bargaining processes in the United States. **This helps American businesses become** and remain **more competitive in the international marketplace and increases the quality of working life of American workers**. Through collective bargaining mediation, FMCS averts or minimizes the impact of work stoppages on the U.S. economy, either in initial bargaining relationships, or in mature bargaining relationships. Relationship development and training programs offer labor and management the skills to improve long-term workplace relationships. Arbitration provides the internal jurisprudence that helps the parties administer their collective bargaining agreements. The grants program promotes innovative, joint approaches to building effective labor-management relationships. Through federal employment mediation, FMCS helps government agencies reduce the likelihood of litigation, speeds up federal processes, and improves the delivery of regulated government services. Our international training and exchange program offers training to foreign governments in these same techniques, promoting the establishment of sound labor-management relations and conflict resolution systems in strategic areas of the world.

#### CP delays and jacks certainty

Ackerman 94 (Susan Rose, Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale University, Duke Law Journal, April, Lexis)

According to Improving Regulatory Systems, the aims of regulatory negotiation are to reduce the time it takes to put a rule into effect and to obtain high levels of compliance. Because affected parties have signed on to the negotiated regulation, they may be both less likely to challenge the rule in court and more likely to comply with it. However, as the authors of the report recognize, regulatory negotiation under current law introduces an extra step that is time-consuming and difficult. One observer advised participants to expect a “roller coaster experience.” Even though regulatory negotiation may shorten the regulatory process in terms of calendar time, the actual hours of participant time [\*12 121 may be greater than under other regulatory procedures. Although a number of regulatory negotiations have been successful, 22 the claims of widespread benefits are mostly speculative. And when it comes to enforcing the regulation, reg neg may not help significantly: even for rules promulgated by standard methods, compliance seems high.

### Immigration NU

#### Not top of the docket, won’t pass, and Obama’s not spending the PC

Hennessey 3-25-13 (Kathleen Hennessey, Obama tries to push stalled immigration talks forward, http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-obama-stalled-immigration-talks-20130325,0,7503326.story)

In January, Obama threatened to send his own bill to Congress if the group did not produce a proposal “in a timely fashion.” His remarks Monday suggest the White House is willing to give the group more time to work before it takes that step.¶ “I expect the debate to begin next month. I want to sign that bill into law as soon as possible,” he said. “We know that real reform means continuing to strengthen our border security and holding employers accountable. … Let’s get this done.”¶ Obama’s time frame may be tough for senators to reach. U.S. Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), chairman of the judiciary committee, already has cast doubt on the chances of getting a bill through his committee by the end of April. Even if the bill comes to the floor next month a vote would not necessarily follow quickly. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) has said he plans to let senators debate the legislation at length, and there remains no clear path for the bill through the Republican-led House.¶ The senators remain deadlocked over several issues, including the details of a guest-worker program and how the legislation will implement and define security at the border.¶ Obama has largely steered clear of the talks, instead offering broad elements he wants to see included. The president on Monday used the platform to revive his call for a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, the key requirement for any bill.

#### Agenda’s dead

Delamaide 3-27 (Darrell, “Obama gains no traction on fiscal, economic fronts,” Market Watch, 2013, <http://articles.marketwatch.com/2013-03-27/commentary/38051670_1_obama-gains-climate-change-second-term>)

President Barack Obama’s second term is only two months old, but it may not be too early to write his political obituary as a mediocre president who meant well. The president stands by — or worse, goes off to play golf with Tiger Woods — while other people make the decisions that determine our economy and many other things in our lives. Congress continues to squabble over budgets and sequestration, with the White House seeming to have little effect on these deliberations. Obama will have to sign a temporary funding bill this week that preserves most of the spending cuts he objects to just to keep the government from shutting down. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and his colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee are keeping the economy afloat with an accommodative monetary policy and no help at all from the administration. Most of the initiatives that Obama announced boldly in his inaugural speech and State of the Union — gun control, immigration and tax reform, action on climate change — seem to be going nowhere fast. His biggest success so far seems to be his ability to play the brackets in March Madness. His recent trip to the Middle East produced little more than an opportunity for Obama to visit the historic Petra site in Jordan. The president who spent most of his first term relying on a lackluster cabinet and abdicating most of the important policy work to a divided Congress, seems intent in his second term on relying on an even more lackluster cabinet and an even more divided Congress. The two biggest accomplishments of Obama’s first term — the Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank financial reform — were largely designed by congressional committees and are proving themselves to be unwieldy and difficult to implement. In his new term, after declaring climate change to be a top priority, Obama appointed the chief executive of a sporting goods manufacturer and Mobil Oil veteran to the key post of Interior secretary. After reaffirming his support for alternative energies, he appointed an academic who champions fracking and nuclear energy as his Energy secretary. Faced with persistent concern about banks being too big to fail, especially in the wake of damaging revelations about the breakdown of risk controls at the country’s largest bank, the president keeps on an attorney general who admits to Congress it’s too difficult to bring big banks to justice because the financial system might collapse if he did. He appoints a Treasury secretary who held a lucrative position at Citigroup in between Democratic administrations and got a handsome payoff when he returned to public service. He nominated a new head of the Securities and Exchange Commission whose biggest claim to fame as a defense attorney is squelching an SEC investigation into possible insider trading by the former head of Morgan Stanley. So just two months into this president’s second term, there’s virtually no trace of the hope and change he promised when he swept to victory in his first presidential campaign in 2008. Instead, the electoral machine that successfully got him elected to the second term has now become more about campaigning than governing. It’s hard to discern exactly what Obama is campaigning for, however. He cannot run for a third term. If what he wants is public pressure to get his policies enacted, or ultimately a renewed Democratic majority in both houses of Congress in 2014, jetting to rallies around the country may not be the best way to get it. Instead, with increasing defections among key Democratic senators — South Dakota’s Tim Johnson is set to announce his retirement — it is looking harder than ever to preserve that party’s slim majority in the Senate, which is ineffective in any case given the lack of filibuster reform. In the meantime, we are stuck with what appears to be a federal government limping along from one fiscal Band-Aid to another. Policy is being made by a sequestration law that was designed to be so abhorrent it would never come into effect. Obama may be tenacious enough to get something done. But right now, after an initial flutter of hope from November’s electoral victory, it’s hard to imagine anything like real change from this administration.

#### Gun control thumps

Murray 3-28 (Mark, “First Thoughts: Obama jumps back into the gun debate,” NBC News, <http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/28/17501341-first-thoughts-obama-jumps-back-into-the-gun-debate?lite>)

Obama jumps back into the gun debate: With some GOP senators vowing to filibuster the legislation coming to the floor next month and with some analysts saying that reformers have already lost, President Obama today steps back into the gun debate with an event at the White House at 11:40 am ET. Per the White House, Obama will stand with mothers, law-enforcement officials, and Vice President Biden in urging Congress to take action on the upcoming Senate legislation, which includes universal background checks. As we have written before, those checks -- supported overwhelmingly in public opinion polls -- will ultimately define success or failure for gun-control advocates. Democrats, led by Sen. Chuck Schumer, are trying to get Republicans to back some type of compromise on background checks, given that the filibuster threat means 60 votes will be needed to even begin considering the legislation. That’s why Michael Bloomberg’s Mayors Against Illegal Guns is airing TV ads in key states to also apply pressure. Meanwhile, Politico reports that Sen. Chuck Grassley, the top GOP lawmaker on the Senate Judiciary Committee, is drafting his own Republican gun bill (without background checks), which “could further complicate what will already be a difficult lift for Democrats and the White House.” \*\*\* Obama, bipartisan group still optimistic on immigration reform: While Obama uses the bully pulpit today on guns, yesterday he used it on immigration by granting interviews to the top Spanish-language TV news outlets. “If we have a bill introduced at the beginning of next month -- as these senators indicate it will be -- then I'm confident that we can get it done certainly before the end of the summer,” Obama told Telemundo regarding the Senate bipartisan activity on immigration, per NBC’s Carrie Dann. “I'm optimistic,” he added. “I've always said that if I see a breakdown in the process, that I've got my own legislation. I'm prepared to step in. But I don't think that's going to be necessary. I think there's a commitment among this group of Democratic and Republican senators to get this done.” Speaking of that bipartisan group senators, four of them (Schumer, John McCain, Jeff Flake, and Michael Bennet) held a press conference yesterday in Arizona, where they also expressed optimism. “I’d say we are 90 percent there,” Schumer said, according to Roll Call. “We have a few little problems to work on; we’ve been on the phone all day talking to our other four colleagues who aren’t here. McCain chimed in: “Nobody is going to be totally happy with this legislation -- no one will be because we are having to make compromises, and that’s what makes for good legislation. It’s compromise that brings everybody together.”

#### Debt ceiling thumps

Parkinson 3-21 (John, “Budget and Funding Done but Debt Limit Battle Brewing,” ABC News, 3-21, <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/03/budget-and-funding-done-but-debt-limit-battle-brewing/>)

After the House of Representatives passed a budget and a stop-gap measure to fund the government through the end of the fiscal year today, Congress is now poised to turn its attention to a fresh battle over a looming debt limit increase.

### A2: India Relations Impact

#### No indo pak war

Giorgio et al 10 (Maia Juel, Tina Søndergaard Madsen, Jakob Wigersma, Mark Westh, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: An Assessment of Deterrence and Stability in the Indian – Pakistan Conflict,” Global Studies, Autumn, http://dspace.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/6041/1/Project%20GS-BA%2c%20Autumn%202010.pdf)

To what extent has nuclear deterrence enhanced stability in the India-Pakistan conflict? Recalling the logical structure of the paper, we here wish to reconcile the three analyses and offer a coherent synthesis of the results in relation to the research question. In order to gather the threads it is beneficial to shortly reflect upon the main results of the three analyses. Firstly, the aim with the thesis was to explore if there is nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, based upon Waltz three requirements. After having undertaken this analysis, we can conclude that Waltz’s requirements for effective nuclear deterrence are in fact fulfilled in both countries. Thus, from a neorealist perspective, is it then possible to deduce that stability reigns between India and Pakistan as a result of nuclear deterrence? Taking a point of departure in neorealist assumptions and nuclear deterrence theory, there is indeed stability between India and Pakistan, as no major war has taken place between the countries, and more importantly, nuclear war has been avoided. Nuclear deterrence has thus been successful in creating stability on a higher structural level.

#### Relations inevitable

Mathai 12(Ranjan is the Foreign Secretary of India, 2012, “India's foreign secretary addresses Washington,”http://www.indusbusinessjournal.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=&type=Publishing&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle&mid=8F3A7027421841978F18BE895F87F791&tier=4&id=E3E6AF44D3C44BED9F987F95ECDD2066)

However, given our different circumstances, history, location and levels of development, we will occasionally have differing perspectives and policies. But, this can be a source of great value and strength in our dialogue; and, it also enables us to work together for a broad global consensus on issues of common interest. But, for that, we should attach real value to each other's perspectives and appreciate each other's interest and sensitivities; and, when we differ, we should be able to speak candidly and respectfully to each other, and **insulate the vast common ground** between us **from** the **differences in our relationship**. We must remember that while we may have occasionally different perspectives, **we are also united by a fundamental stake in each other’s success**, because in succeeding individually, we can advance our common interests and inspire a world mirrored in our ideals. And, **even if our** two **governments did nothing**, it would still be an extraordinary relationship, because of the growing ties of kinship between our people and the vitality of private partnerships of enterprise, innovation, research and education across every field of human endeavor. But, I believe that we have the political momentum, public goodwill, a comprehensive architecture of engagement, comfort and confidence in the relationship, the experience of bold and ambitious undertakings, a proven capacity to work through challenges and, as we have seen in recent years, a growing habit of taking tangible steps on a regular basis to advance our cooperation. So, as I look ahead, we will continue to consolidate and affirm our strategic partnership, by completing existing projects and focusing on the wealth of new opportunities that we have. We should continue to stay in close touch on the current challenges in the world, in our neighborhood and beyond. And, we should, above all, continue to strengthen and expand the long-term strategic framework of our relationship, so that we can fully harness the boundless opportunities that this relationship has for our people and the substantial benefit that it can bring to this world.

### Obama Good – 2AC

#### Bipartisan and coal industry support

Lavelle 07

[Marianne, U.S. News and World Report, 6/13/07, <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/070613/13coal.htm>]

The idea that everyone's suddenly talking about on Capitol Hill is coal to liquid, a pricey technology that hasn't played a significant role in the global energy picture outside of Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa. While the liquid fuel that is produced is a clean-burning diesel, environmentalists are aghast at the carbon emissions and water use involved in the process. But coal-state Democrats and Republicans alike are pushing for big federal subsidies to get the idea off the ground in the United States, arguing that support for the home-mined fuel alternative is a national security concern. It's also an economic security issue for the coal industry, which has been buffeted by the trend of electric companies shunning the high-sulfur, premium-priced coal of Central Appalachia. Eastern power producers have found they can much more easily meet federal acid rain regulations by buying the low-sulfur, lower-priced coal of the West, even though they have to pay substantial rail shipping fees.

#### And Coal support outweighs the link- it’d be a win

Reisinger 9 – JD, Attorney @ Ohio Environmental Council

Will, “RECONCILING KING COAL AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, http://vjel.org/journal/pdf/VJEL10107.pdf

Princeton’s dispassionate assessment leads us to the conclusion that coal will not disappear as an energy source in the immediate future. Coal produces such a large percentage of electricity generation that other sources alone cannot meet the country’s demands in the short term. Coal-burning power plants currently provide half of the electricity produced in the U.S. and are responsible for one-fourth of global carbon emissions. 25 Cleaner, carbon-neutral sources such as wind and solar energy, or the more controversial expansion of nuclear power generation, have the potential to replace most or all coal-generated power in the future. But at present, the U.S. is not able to meet its base load power needs solely with renewable or carbon-neutral options. 26 The nation simply does not have the infrastructure to allow renewable energy sources such as wind and solar to replace fossil-fuel power generation in the near term. The expansion of nuclear generation faces still greater opposition across the political spectrum due to concerns over public health and national security. Coal has strong political support throughout the country as America’s only abundant domestic fossil energy resource. The coal industry is responsible for more than 80,000 jobs nationwide, contributing billions to the economies of coal-producing states. 27 Legislators from these regions will fight vigorously to ensure the continued viability of the coal industry. As Mike Morris, Chief Executive Officer of American Electric Power, has stated, “We have 25 ‘coal states.’ That’s 50 Senators whose states depend on this economy.” 28

#### Not intrinsic- rational policymaker do the plan and pass \_\_\_- k2 effective decisionmaking

#### Winners win.

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

#### Capital does not affect the agenda

**Dickinson 9** (Matthew, Professor of political science at Middlebury College, Sotomayer, Obama and Presidential Power, Presidential Power, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/)

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

#### Pentagon shields

Davenport 12

[Coral, energy and environment correspondent for National Journal, Prior to joining National Journal in 2010, Davenport covered energy and environment for Politico, and before that, for Congressional Quarterly. In 2010, she was a fellow with the Metcalf Institute for Marine and Environmental Reporting. From 2001 to 2004, Davenport worked in Athens, Greece, as a correspondent for numerous publications, including the Christian Science Monitor and USA Today, covering politics, economics, international relations and terrorism in southeastern Europe. She also covered the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, and was a contributing writer to the Fodor’s, Time Out, Eyewitness and Funseekers’ guidebook series. Davenport started her journalism career at the Daily Hampshire Gazette in Northampton, Massachusetts, after graduating from Smith College with a degree in English literature. National Journal, 2/10, White House Budget to Expand Clean-Energy Programs Through Pentagon, ProQuest]

The White House believes it has figured out how to get more money for clean-energy programs touted by President Obama without having it become political roadkill in the wake of the Solyndra controversy: **Put it in the Pentagon**. While details are thin on the ground, lawmakers who work on both energy- and defense-spending policy believe the fiscal 2013 budget request to be delivered to Congress on Monday probably won't include big increases for wind and solar power through the Energy Department, a major target for Republicans since solar-panel maker Solyndra defaulted last year on a $535 million loan guarantee. But they do expect to see increases in spending on alternative energy in the Defense Department, such as programs to replace traditional jet fuel with biofuels, supply troops on the front lines with solar-powered electronic equipment, build hybrid-engine tanks and aircraft carriers, and increase renewable-energy use on military bases. While Republicans will instantly shoot down requests for fresh spending on Energy Department programs that could be likened to the one that funded Solyndra, many support alternative-energy programs for the military. "I do expect to see the spending," said Rep. Jack Kingston, R-Ga., a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, when asked about increased investment in alternative-energy programs at the Pentagon. "I think in the past three to five years this has been going on, but that it has grown as a culture and a practice - and it's a good thing." "If Israel attacks Iran, and we have to go to war - and the Straits of Hormuz are closed for a week or a month and the price of fuel is going to be high," Kingston said, "the question is, in the military, what do you replace it with? It's not something you just do for the ozone. It's strategic." Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who sits on both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, said, "I don't see what they're doing in DOD as being Solyndra." "We're not talking about putting $500 million into a goofy idea," Graham told National Journal . "We're talking about taking applications of technologies that work and expanding them. I wouldn't be for DOD having a bunch of money to play around with renewable technologies that have no hope. But from what I understand, there are renewables out there that already work." A senior House Democrat noted that this wouldn't be the first time that the **Pentagon has been utilized to advance policies that wouldn't otherwise be supported**. "They did it in the '90s with medical research," said Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., ranking member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. In 1993, when funding was frozen for breast-cancer research programs in the National Institutes of Health, Congress boosted the Pentagon's budget for breast-cancer research - to more than double that of the health agency's funding in that area. **Politically, the strategy makes sense**. Republicans are ready to fire at the first sign of any pet Obama program, and renewable programs at the Energy Department are an exceptionally ripe target. That's because of Solyndra, but also because, in the last two years, the Energy Department received a massive $40 billion infusion in funding for clean-energy programs from the stimulus law, a signature Obama policy. When that money runs out this year, a request for more on top of it would be met with flat-out derision from most congressional Republicans. Increasing renewable-energy initiatives at the Pentagon can also help Obama advance his broader, national goals for transitioning the U.S. economy from fossil fuels to alternative sources. As the largest industrial consumer of energy in the world, the U.S. military can have a significant impact on energy markets - if it demands significant amounts of energy from alternative sources, it could help scale up production and ramp down prices for clean energy on the commercial market. Obama acknowledged those impacts in a speech last month at the Buckley Air Force Base in Colorado. "The Navy is going to purchase enough clean-energy capacity to power a quarter of a million homes a year. And it won't cost taxpayers a dime," Obama said. "What does it mean? It means that the world's largest consumer of energy - the Department of Defense - is making one of the largest commitments to clean energy in history," the president added. "That will grow this market, it will strengthen our energy security." Experts also hope that Pentagon engagement in clean-energy technology could help yield breakthroughs with commercial applications. Kingston acknowledged that the upfront costs for alternative fuels are higher than for conventional oil and gasoline. For example, the Air Force has pursued contracts to purchase biofuels made from algae and camelina, a grass-like plant, but those fuels can cost up to $150 a barrel, compared to oil, which is lately going for around $100 a barrel. Fuel-efficient hybrid tanks can cost $1 million more than conventional tanks - although in the long run they can help lessen the military's oil dependence, Kingston said Republicans recognize that the up-front cost can yield a payoff later. "It wouldn't be dead on arrival. But we'd need to see a two- to three-year payoff on the investment," Kingston said. Military officials - particularly Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, who has made alternative energy a cornerstone of his tenure - have been telling Congress for years that the military's dependence on fossil fuels puts the troops - and the nation's security - at risk. Mabus has focused on meeting an ambitious mandate from a 2007 law to supply 25 percent of the military's electricity from renewable power sources by 2025. (Obama has tried and failed to pass a similar national mandate.) Last June, the DOD rolled out its first department-wide energy policy to coalesce alternative and energy-efficient initiatives across the military services. In January, the department announced that a study of military installations in the western United States found four California desert bases suitable to produce enough solar energy - 7,000 megawatts - to match seven nuclear power plants. And so far, those **moves have met with approval from congressional Republicans**. Even so, any request for new Pentagon spending will be met with greater scrutiny this year. The Pentagon's budget is already under a microscope, due to $500 billion in automatic cuts to defense spending slated to take effect in 2013. But even with those challenges, clean-energy spending probably won't stand out as much in the military budget as it would in the Energy Department budget. Despite its name, the Energy Department has traditionally had little to do with energy policy - its chief portfolio is maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal. Without the stimulus money, last year only $1.9 billion of Energy's $32 billion budget went to clean-energy programs. A spending increase of just $1 billion would make a big difference in the agency's bottom line. But it would probably be easier to tuck another $1 billion or $2 billion on clean-energy spending into the Pentagon's $518 billion budget. Last year, the Pentagon spent about $1 billion on renewable energy and energy-efficiency programs across its departments.

## 1AR

### A2: China Link

#### Recognizing conflict as *one possible* outcome for U.S. –China relations doesn’t essentialize Chinese behavior—avoids self-fulfilling prophecy.

Andrew **LEONARD** Senior Technology Writier @ Salon 8-21-**‘9** “Hu Jintao is no Kaiser Wilhelm” http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2009/08/21/hu\_jintao\_is\_the\_new\_kaiser\_wilhelm/

I don't think Hu Jintao makes a good Kaiser Wilhelm and I think it is foolhardy to predict what will happen with the kind of thunderous certainty that is Ferguson's stock-in-trade. A superpower clash, whether economic or military, between the U.S. and China is in no one's interest. World War I, of course, wasn't ultimately in anyone's interest either, but Europe seems to have learned from its 20th century mistakes, at least so far, so maybe we can too. I'm with James Fallows; just to assert that a disastrous divorce is **inevitable** is positively dangerous because it ignores a **world of other possibilities**, anhd constricts our freedom to move.

Even historians -- or especially historians -- recognize that world events are shaped in part by deep economic, demographic, and technical trends, but only in part. Real human beings make real decisions that have real effects. (Cf: LBJ in 1964, Bush-Cheney in 2001, JFK-Khrushchev in 1962, etc.) If we recognize that a collision with China is **possible,** but **only one of several possibilities**, then we act so as to reduce that possibility and increase the probability of **better outcomes**. If we think breakup is inevitable, as Ferguson is arguing, then the odds of a collision in fact occurring become higher than they would otherwise be. (Because each side interprets the other's moves in the darkest way and responds in kind.)

### F/W Cards

#### Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the cautious detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

### Neoliberalism – A2 Root Cause of Econ Inequality

#### Neoliberalism isn't the root cause of economic inequality or crises – historical data and developments contradict

Norfield 12 (Tony, PhD Candidate in Economics @ SOAS - Univ. of London, "‘The most detailed account available’ – more praise for ‘The Failure of Capitalist Production’," http://plutopress.wordpress.com/2012/03/22/the-most-detailed-account-available-more-praise-for-the-failure-of-capitalist-production/)

Writing on the Economics of Imperialism blog, Tony Norfield praises Andrew Kliman’s The Failure of Capitalist Production as “probably the most detailed, and effective, assessment of the economic statistics behind what happened [during the economic crisis] that is available”. Norfield writes:¶ The Failure of Capitalist Production has two main theses. Firstly, it argues that the major post-war crisis of the 1970s did not result in enough destruction of capital values to provide the basis for sustained accumulation thereafter. This meant that profitability showed little, if any, sign of recovery and economic growth remained weak. This, in turn, set the stage for credit-driven, speculative bubbles, not least the biggest and most recent one that has burst with such intractable consequences. Secondly, and following from this analysis, it argues that the common radical arguments about the nature of the crisis are myths. ‘Neoliberal’ economic policies did not cut real wages and did not divert resources into finance and away from production. A close look at the data for the US finds no evidence for these assertions. Instead, the slow growth of incomes and investment is shown to be a consequence of problems with capital accumulation, problems that resulted from inadequate profitability…¶ His case is well made, and is convincing. These are critical points for an attack on the notion that mistaken government policies – or a ‘neoliberal coup’, as some writers suggest – are the root cause of the crisis. Kliman shows that the deterioration in profitability, investment, growth, etc, began in the late 1960s or in the 1970s, prior to the beginnings of the ‘neoliberal’ era that is usually dated from 1979-81 with the Reagan (US) and Thatcher (UK) political regimes.

### More – Neolib =/= War

#### Neoliberalism doesn't cause war – theory can’t explain conflict dynamics

Doyle and Sambanis 11 (Michael and Nicholas, Prof of Int Affairs @ Columbia and Assoc Prof of PoliSci @ Yale, "Making War and Building Peace: The United Nations since the 1990’s," http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/sambanis%2011-08-04.pdf)

Civil wars are sometimes linked to bad leaders and sometimes to bad ¶ neighborhoods or bad external influences by neighboring states or by the major powers. ¶ International relations (IR) theories should be able to explain the inter-national ¶ dimensions of civil war. However, the skeletal theories of IR –neorealism and ¶ neoliberalism— offer poor explanations of civil war.¶ 71¶ Neorealism cannot explain why ¶ ethnic, religious, or class-based divisions occur or why they may be important causes of ¶ civil war, since it assumes that states are unitary actors and outcomes are usually ¶ explained as a result of structural changes at the level of the international system. State ¶ failure, which is frequently associated with civil war, generates conditions of domestic ¶ anarchy that parallel the condition of international anarchy. This makes structural ¶ realism (neorealism) tangentially relevant to civil war, given the central role of anarchy in ¶ neorealism. However, anarchy in civil war emerges endogenously and is not a preexisting (constant) structural condition. Neorealism cannot explain the causes of ¶ domestic anarchy (elite-based explanations, ethnic divisions, institutional failure), so it ¶ can only be of use in explaining patterns of violence after civil war erupts and once state ¶ control collapses. ¶ By contrast, neoliberalism’s focus on domestic political institutions allows it to ¶ better explain why civil war occurs in the first place.¶ 72¶ Neoliberalism also takes into ¶ consideration non-state actors (e.g. ethnic networks, crime syndicates, multinational ¶ corporations) and can consider their influence on civil war risk. But neoliberalism also ¶ has important shortcomings as it cannot explain domestic institutional change or the use ¶ of force in ethnic antagonisms, nor can it explain patterns of alliance and conflict among ¶ insurgent groups and the government. Thus, the usefulness of mainstream IR theory in ¶ analyzing civil war is limited.

### Consequences

#### -- Evaluate consequences – allowing violence for the sake of moral purity is evil

Isaac 2 (Jeffrey C., Professor of Political Science – Indiana-Bloomington, Director – Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, Ph.D. – Yale, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the **clean conscience** of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about **unintended consequences** as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

### VTL Inev

#### Life has intrinsic value that is unattached to instrumental capacity

Penner 5 (Melinda, Director of Operations – STR, “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223)

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but **even if it loses its instrumental value**, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience.

### World getting Better – Heg

#### Heg is the root cause of structural decline in conflict---prevents escalation of rivalries globally

**Drezner** **05**

 (Daniel – professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law, Gregg Easterbrook, War, and the Dangers of Extrapolation, p. http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html)

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been **steadily fewer armed conflicts** worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now **less than half** what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window. UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot ofthem. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.